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This thesis purports to examine the general develop¬
ment of three major Palestinian resistance movements in order
to determine their prospects for achieving a successful lib¬
eration of Palestine. This thesis will also examine, ana¬
lyze and evaluate the political activities of the Fedayeen^
in order to determine the extent to which it may be possible
to achieve a common front of both Arab Palestinians and
Jewish population against the Zionist institutions in order to
establish a democratic state in what is now called "Israel."
Since there is no historical precedent for a
democratic state in the Middle East, this study will offer
an evaluation of a democratic state strategy in terms of its
development in the theory and practice of the Palestinian
liberation struggle during the period 1965-1973. Such an
evaluation is needed since there is very little consensus
Fedayeen literally translated from Arabic means men
of sacrifice. The term is used here to refer collectively
to the Resistance Movement, i.e., El-Fateh, (PFLP) Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, (PDFLP) Popular
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
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regarding the best way to bring such diverse interests as
those of the Arab Palestinians and the Zionists together for
the purpose of forming a viable political community. Central
to the Arab-Zionist impasse are the mutual, and perhaps
mutually justifiable, claims of Jews and Palestinians to the
right of national self-determination. Thus, the goal of a
unitary, inclusive, democratic Palestine of both Palestinians
and Jews may constitute the only hope for a peaceful settle¬
ment of Palestinian and Jewish claims. If such Arab-Jewish
solidarity had been achieved in the 1920s and 1930s, when
Zionists sought a refuge for the Jewish victims of anti-
Semitism and Nazism, the way could have been paved for a
much more effective thrust on a world-wide scale to save the
Jews from European anti-Semitism and Hitler by migration to
Palestine and to other countries. Therefore, an objective
assessment of whether Palestinian-Jewish solidarity is fea¬
sible is paramount if genuine peace is to come to the Middle
East.
After an extensive survey of the literature on the
Arab-Israeli conflict, I have come to view this conflict in
terms of two ideologies: Zionist ideology which advocates an
exclusive Jewish state; and a Palestinian nationalist
ideology which advocates Arab-Jewish solidarity for a
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democratic non-sectarian state. Because of advanced commu¬
nication media, information on the Arab-Israeli conflict has
been disseminated in a variety of forms. Pro-Zionist
literature of varied kinds has been able to succeed espe¬
cially well in the United States, possibly because Zionism
has been made to appear as a force of "progress and liber¬
ation in a backward Arab world." Although many Western
newspapers and news agencies give good quantity of reportage
of Middle East happenings, they often show a definite
prejudice against reporting the background of the news,
which, as it affects international relations in the area,
is vital.
The basic thrust of the pro-Zionist position in
Western countries, particularly the United States, can be
summarized as follows:
1. The "ceaseless Zionist propaganda campaign" in
favor of the state of Israel;
2. A Western bias against the Arabs as an alien race
with an alien religion and culture stemming from
the centuries of conflict during the Crusade era,
combined with misconception of the modern history
of Palestine; and
3. Zionist aims corresponding closely to the interest
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of the Western colonial powers (headed by the
United States) in implementing their Imperialist
policies in the area and most plainly on the
Palestine question.
Zionist supporters, Jews and non-Jews, have been an
essential factor in Israel's creation and development. The
"ceaseless Zionist campaign" for control over Jewish commu¬
nities as well as Christian communities in various forms
has been "skillfully" carried on in the United States
reflecting a definite stand regarding Israel. Well financed
and well organized, Zionist organizations were founded all
over the United States. These Zionist organizations in the
United States strengthen Israel's position versus the
Arabs' . They try to control every aspect of Jewish life to
advance the goals and objectives of the state of Israel.
The history of Zionism in the U.S. is a story of unin¬
terrupted success, and its greatest triumphs were those
scored within the American Jewish community itself. The
Zionists, starting from a relatively small group in the
early 1940s, were able to become the strongest Jewish
organization in the world, exercising varying forms of
control on practically every Jewish organization in the
U.S., religious as well as secular.^
Further strength of the Israeli position has
resulted from the increasing frequency of the wide and
^Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel; The Lethal
Dilemma (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 30.
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thorough news coverage of the prominent American networks.
The techniques used to influence American public
opinion in favor of a pro-Zionist foreign policy include:
Speakers lecturing throughout the country, placement of
articles on Israel in some of the leading magazines, radio
and TV programs "sympathetic" to Israel, and trips to Israel
by academicians and other influential Americans. Through
strong Zionist influence over the mass media, Zionists were
able to control American public opinion by picturing Israel
as a "democratic little state with the mission of spreading
civilization in the backward Arab world." In addition,
Zionism and its allied forces can raise sizable funds on the
shortest notice, where as Arab nationalism in the American
press is looked upon as fanatical and un-democratic.
The average American, including the educated American,
not only continues to have a distorted image of the
Arab and the Arab world, but is frequently hostile
toward them. This is probably derived from images and
misconception acquired in schools or at the movies, but
also—increasingly in the past two decades—from subtle
anti-Arab propaganda reinforcing and, so to speak,
legitimizing bias.^
Hitler's genocide created Western guilt feelings
towards the Zionist dream. In the West, the burden of guilt
left by Hitler's crime against the Jews created new
^Ibid., p. 22.
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supporters. They gave all-out support to the establishment
of the Zionist state with a definite political philosophy.
The influence of both American public opinion and
pressure groups is manifest in the American foreign policy
towards the Middle East bending policy in favor of Israel.
Consequently, strong political, economic and military ties
exist between Israel and the United States. This relation¬
ship is based on mutual interest, namely, maintaining the
military superiority of Israel as an aggressive capitalist
nation-state against the Arab national movements which are
tending towards progressive even socialist objectives.
All these factors played a major role in bringing
but one side of the story to the public. That side shows
the glowing account of the conquest of the desert by Israeli
immigrants, but fails to present what happened to the
Palestinian refugees and their right for self-determination
in their own homeland, Palestine.
More balance accounts of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict are now available (though most primary materials
are in Arabic). This reflects the growing involvement of the
super powers in the matter and the emergence of the
Palestinian resistance into public view, especially since
this resistance realized the importance of other Arab and
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outside support after the June 1967 war. Consequently,
there are continuous publications from the Palestinian
resistance seeking to gain Palestinian, Arab and world-wide
support. Besides, there are some independent studies of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict from socialist groups. The
Palestinian national struggle is part of the Third World
struggle towards independence, self-determination, revo¬
lution, etc.
The question of whether the Jews and the Palestinians
have an equal right to national self-determination is con¬
sidered the central issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Thus, the basic concept that will be used in this study is
the question of self-determination.
"Self-determination" is the right of nations to
political and economic independence from colonial domination;
to be able to set up their own educational institutions,
maintain public currency in their own national languages;
the right to self governing community; and their right to
appeal to the international community when their rights are
denied.
This analysis moves from the assumption that
Palestinians and Jews have equal rights to national self-
determination in Palestine. In addition, it is agreed by
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all major Palestinian resistance groups that they would
stand together for the Jews as well as the Palestinian's
national rights in Palestine.
The method of research is historical and analytical.
The first chapter will be a short historical analysis of
criteria for a successful and progressive democratic state.
The second chapter will be a historical consider¬
ation of the origins of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in
order to get an overall insight into the history, culture
and the politics of Zionism and Arab nationalism. It will
also cover the British attitude towards the Palestinians
and Jews during the mandate period (1918-1947) . In addition,
it will include the role of the Arab states in the conflict,
particularly in the period 1948-1967.
The third chapter will take an historical and ana¬
lytical approach to two Palestinian movements, the war prior
to 1948 and the contemporary one. It will analyze their
military and political activities, related events and accom¬
plishments .
The fourth chapter will examine and analyze the con¬
temporary Palestinian resistance movements. It will also
examine prospects for eventual success to the problem accord¬
ing to the structure and strategy of the movements and the
9
support they can get from Arab countries and other external
powers . This chapter will also examine the policy of
Imperialism, Arab reactionary regimes and the Zionist move¬
ment towards Pedayeen activities. Hopefully, this analysis
will lead to assessment of the likelihood that progressive
elements in the area (Arab and Jews) will achieve a solution
of the problem both in theory and practice. For if the
struggle is carried on by all progressive elements in the
area, especially in the ranks of the Palestinians resistance
movement, Israeli society and progressive Jews a truly
democratic solution of Jews and Arabs can possibly be
achieved.
CHAPTER I
CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL AND PROGRESSIVE
DEMOCRATIC STATE
This chapter will be a short historical analysis of
certain preconditions deemed necessary for the emergence of
a successful democratic society. Of the many concepts as¬
sociated with political democracy, Harvey Wheeler discusses
three modern forms of democracy as well as some major pre¬
conditions for the emergence of a democratic society.
According to Wheeler, the direction that a political democ¬
racy takes is based upon "the specific type of despotism it
was designed to counteract."^ In distinguishing various
modern forms of democracy, Wheeler's argument defines them
in terms of their cultural system, their technological
system, their social structure, and their notion of
^Harvey Wheeler, Democracy In A Revolutionary Era
(Santa Barbara, California: The Center for the Study of




From these variables, Wheeler has defined three
modern forms of democracy: liberal democracy, collectivist
democracy and nationalist democracy.
1. Liberal democracy is a notion of the Western
countries; i.e., constitutional democracy.
2. Collectivist democracy is a notion of some
European and Third World countries; i.e., social¬
ist democracy.
3. Nationalist democracy is a notion of countries
just emerging from the burdens of Western
imperialism.^
The Western middle class democracy, which began in
the 17th century, continues to be regarded as predominantly
political and legal. A historical example of the emergence
of this type of democracy is the American Revolution. The
reason for the change was the desire of the states for a
constitutional modification with fewer restriction than the
^Wheeler has a thesis similar to what Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. was saying on the technological imperative
resulting from nuclear age. King says: "It is no longer a
choice between violence and nonviolence in this world. It
is nonviolence or nonexistence. That is where we are today."
Quoted from Richard C. Gregory, No More Lies (New York:
Evanston, 1972), p. 339.
^Ibid., p. 6.
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monarchial British rule. The Western middle class con¬
ception of democracy was influenced by the writings of Locke,
Rousseau, Montesquieu, and others. These British and French
philosophers denounced authoritarian rule. They believed in
man's instinct towards political society, and the consent of
the governed. The purpose of this man-made government and
man-maintained government is to preserve man's natural
rights: life, liberty and property. The wording of the
American Declaration of Independence derived from these
principles:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—
That to secure these rights. Government are instituted
among Men, deriving their just power from the Consent
of the governed.^
Analytically, constitutional democracy has had two
distinct features. In one sense, it has dealt with certain
abuses of the old-style despotic state; specifically, the
absolute rule of one man over the judicial and legislative
domain. Carl J. Friedrich equates "the division of powers"
with "constitutional democracy":
...Constitutionalism by dividing power provides a
system of effective restraints upon governmental action.
^Quoted in William H. Riker, Democracy in the United
States, 2nd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 352.
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In studying it, one has to explore methods and tech¬
niques by which such restraints are established and
maintained.^
The other more pronounced feature of constitutional democ¬
racy is its fear of the mass of people, the great majority.
The advocates of constitutional democracy demand govern¬
mental power, divided into three distinct branches so that
each branch is given constitutional power to check the
others, in order, as James Madison said, "to guard one part
2
of society against the injustices of the other part."
Alexander Hamilton, one of the chief architects of the
American constitution, describes which proprietor would thus
be protected:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the
many. The first are the rich and well-born, the other
the mass of the people. The voice of the people has
been said to be the voice of God; and however generally
this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true
in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they
seldom judge or determine right. Given therefore to the
first class a distinct, permanent share in the govern¬
ment. They will check the unsteadiness of the second,
and as they cannot receive any advantage by change, they
therefore will ever maintain good government.^
It would be impractical to advocate liberal democracy
^Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and
Democracy (New York: A Division of the Ginn Co., 1950), p. 26.
2
Quoted in Riker, Democracy, p. 139.
^Ibid., p. 138.
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for people struggling against oppression. An ideology which
favors the rich over the poor, exploiter over the exploited,
owners over workers, will lack popular support in struggling
countries and is hardly acceptable, especially to oppressed
people in an age of rapid economic and technical change.
Further, the ideology of individual civil rights stressed by
advocates of liberal democracy has little support in pro¬
gressive circles in the Third World. "Individualism is
criticized as a narrow, constricting, negative concept with
which the Western world is obsessed and by which it is
blinded to the problems of African and Asian countries; if
not, indeed, to some of the ills of its own society."^ An
offshoot of this position came out of a conclusion in a
seminar on "Women and Population," held in New York on
November 24, 1974, in which the participants agreed that
"what is appropriate for Western women from an industrial¬
ized state may be detrimental to the Third World women from
2
a developing nation." What Third World women will support
is a system that addresses itself to "poverty and
^Irene L. Gendzier, A Middle East Reader (New York:
Pegasus, 1969), p. 49.
^The Atlanta Constitution, November 25, 1974,
Section B, p. 5.
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ignorance," inequality, bad housing, unemployment, and
class discrimination. Such a system is more likely to be a
collective democracy rather than any other form of democracy.
While the liberal democrats supported the domination
of society by the wealthy few, the collectivist democrats
intended to place the poor masses in control. Initially,
however, the socialists (later referred to as utopian
socialists) failed to make a concrete linkage between the
ongoing historical processes and the emergence of socialist
society. According to Marx and Engels, modern socialism is
an extension of the principles of the early writings of
2
"utopian socialism": Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier in
France and Robert Owen in England, though "none of them
appears as a representative of the interest of that prole¬
tariat, which historical development had in the meantime
3
produced."
Dr. Dora Obi Chiza, a Nigerian medical doctor, says:
"We never had enough food because we have never been able to
extract ourselves from ignorance." Ibid.
2
Marx and Engels classified Saint-Simon, Fourier and
Owen as "utopian socialism," in relation to the "scientific
socialism" based on materialist conception of history.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., vol. 10 (Chicago, 1974),
p. 316.
3
Frederick Engels, Socialism: From Utopian to Science
(New York: Brooklyn, 1968), p. 5. (The first English trans¬
lation in 1892 by Daniel Deleon, was entitled Development of
Socialism: From Utopia to Science.)
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The utopian socialists refused to accept society as
it was, and sought change towards more humane forms. The
most important principle they worked for was the abolition
of capitalism. They were against capitalism because it was
evil, unjust and without a long-term plan. Thus, they
looked for a more just society that had a better plan. They
believed that through good will and understanding by all men
they could attain their ideal society. It did not work that
easily.
The Utopian Socialists were humanitarians vdio reacted
strongly to the harsh environment of capitalism. They
made valid and penetrating criticism of capitalism and
invented schemes for building a better world. While
they were preaching their Gospel, two men were born who
were to approach the problem in a different way: their
names were Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.^
Marx was the first social thinker to make a system¬
atic critical analysis of capitalist production. He showed
that socialism was not a utopian ideal, but it could be the
next step in the historical development of mankind. In the
words of Engels: "These two great discoveries, the materi¬
alist conception of history and the revelation of the secret
of capitalist production through surplus value, we owe to
Marx.
^Leo Huberman and Sybil H. May, The ABC of Socialism
(New York: Monthly Review, 1953), p. 34.
2
Engels, Socialism, p. 35.
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Socialism was transformed from utopia to science by
Marx. He explained history on the basis of class relation¬
ships to the modes of production and distribution.
The materialist conception of History starts from the
proposition that the production of the means to support
hiiman life and, next to production, the exchange of
things produced, is the basis of all social structure;
that in every society that has appeared in history, the
manner in which wealth is distributed and society
divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what
is produced, how it is produced, and how the products
are changed.^
Marx relied on the working class to liberate itself and be¬
come the maker of the new order. According to him, the
working class could achieve socialist democracy through
revolution if the ruling class state was destroyed and a
working class state established in its place. Marx's theory
was that in order for true democracy to be obtained, all
institutions should be controlled and administered by those
who live and work in them. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx
says;
The working men have no country. We cannot take from
them what they have not got. Since the proletariat
must first of all acquire political supremacy, must
rise to be the leading class of the nation, must con¬
stitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national
though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.2
^Ibid., p. 37
2Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Mani¬
festo (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 28.
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Most Western writers conclude from this that Marx
means to replace the dictatorship of capitalist class: i.e.,
the few, by the dictatorship of the working class; i.e., the
many. It is the goal of the working class democratic strug¬
gle to make the workers rule over the class to which they
were subjects. And when the proletariat seized political
power, it would place the means of production and distribu¬
tion under state control.
It is important to understand, however, that despite
these misinterpretations, the socialists' goal is not the
substitution of one form of class rule for another, but the
abolition of all classes. The goal of Marx is a classless
society in which all forms of exploitation are eliminated.
And the dictatorship of the proletariat is only the neces¬
sary first step towards the abolition of class rule.
The best way out would appear to be a fundamental
change in the economic, political and social organization of
society, with revolution by the working class as the means
to achieve it. Marx believes that in order for a democratic
collectivism to be successful, the revolution must happen at
the right time; society cannot be transformed unless its
economic development has made it ripe for change. Marx says:
"The mode of production in material life dominates the
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general character of the social, political and spiritual
process of life. It is not the consciousness of men that
determine their being, but, on the contrary their social
being that determine their consciousness."^
Though both Russia and China went through different
paths toward socialism according to their culture, tradition,
religion and history, both proved that a bourgeois class was
not a necessary prerequisite for the socialist-democratic
revolution to succeed. Both countries transformed them¬
selves from feudal and imperialist societies to socialist
societies.
Lenin came up with a new idea. He believed that the
party must be in the forefront of the proletariat and must
lead the working class and its allies, e.g., the peasantry.
He also believed that the party must help the peasantry by
obtaining land.
Lenin's theory of a revolutionary party, through which
power can be achieved and the old order destroyed, was
an important addition to the democratic theory of the
rule of the proletariat, as developed by Marx. It was
Lenin who correctly interpreted Marx and who succeeded
in leading the first explicity Marxist democratic
revolution. The Leninist theory of revolutionary
activity understands revolution as a product of conscious
activity. He correctly understand that democracy, at
least in most of the world, can be achieved only if
^Quoted in Huberman and May, The ABC, p. 36.
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existing state and social structures are destroyed.
Piecemeal changes in a country without a democratic
tradition can bring no significant social change.^
In China, Mao Tse-Tung worked toward different ideas
for democratic revolution. Since China was as underdevel¬
oped as Russia and lacked any semblance of a proletarian
class, Mao looked for a new revolutionary force. He worked
with the peasantry hoping to establish an effective and
democratic revolutionary party. This party proved its
abilities for creating a democratic society through years of
difficult struggle with imperialist and nationalist forces.
It is fair to say that in some ways the democratic revolu¬
tion in China was more successful than the Russian Revolu¬
tion even though both revolutions worked to correct the
evils of capitalism and abolish all forms of exploitation.
The Chinese Revolution worked through a democratic movement.
Chinese soldiers were close to their people. They under¬
stood their people, and everything was done from an analysis
of people's needs. The Red Army in China was created by the
peasants. They were trained not only as officers for
devoted revolutionary service but also for revolutionary
democratic principles: social equality, equal sharing of
^Kenneth A. Megil, The New Democratic Theory (New
York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 40-41.
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hardships by soldiers and officers and by civilians as well.
The democratic revolution in China helped the peasants in
reducing feudal exploitation, not in liquidating it entirely.
Thus, the road to socialist democracy can be taken
by countries without a strong proletarian class. This road
can be the result of a united front against alien domina¬
tion, capitalism and national oppression. In many of the
Third World countries, national-democratic movements were
led by progressive parties which united all revolutionary
forces against imperialism and achieved their political inde¬
pendence after a long and hard political and armed struggle
regardless of class and political loyalties. Mao says:
In a struggle that is national in character, the class
struggle, which demonstrates the identity between the
two...The first step is to change the colonial, semi
colonial form of society into an independent, democratic
society. The second is to carry the revolution forward
and build a socialist society.^
To gain a proper understanding of the emerging
national-democratic movements in the present period, it is
necessary to distinguish between two concrete historical
characteristics of nationalism: Western nationalism and
Third World nationalism.
^Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, vol. 2 (Peking, 1967),
pp. 215, 342.
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Nationalism was a progressive phenomenon in aiding
an emerging bourgeoisie in its struggle against the final
disintegration of feudal relationships in Europe. Indus¬
trial capitalism and the mechanization of agriculture, which
had risen in Western Europe during the first half of the
19th century, rapidly developed in Eastern Europe following
the liberation of the Russian peasants (1863) and the
loosening of feudal restrictions. Thus, a fundamental
change in the economic system of Western Europe began. Pro¬
duction for the self-contained feudal unit (family, village
or manor) was replaced by production for trade, and the
agriculturally-based economy of Western Europe slowly
changed to an economy based on industrial production. The
expansion of trade demanded centralized states and nation
building, a process which was facilitated by the ideology of
nationalism. Nationalism was necessary to break down the
isolated feudal units so that they could be combined and
regulated for effecient production of goods for trade.
During the following centuries capitalism spawned the ide¬
ology of colonialism and enhanced racism when it became
necessary to justify the economic and social expansion of
capital to other parts of the world. These two concepts
provided a rationale for European colonization, exploitation
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and national oppression of non-European lands and peoples.
As Stalin notes:
The subsequent growth of capitalism in Europe, the need
for new markets, the search for raw materials and fuel,
and, finally, the development of imperialism, the export
of capital and the necessity of protecting the great sea
and rail routes, have led,...to the seizure of new
territories by the old national states and the conversion
of the latter into multi-national (colonial) states with
the national oppression and national conflicts natural
to multi-national states (Great Britain, France, Germany,
Italy)
The new nationalism of oppressed peoples did not go
through the same evolutionary development as Western nation¬
alism whose "progress" was associated with a substantially
developed bourgeoisie. The conditions of the growth of na¬
tional movements and nation states in Third World countries
was not the same as in Western Europe. These colonies and
semi-colonies did not have the chance to develop capitalism.
On the contrary, they were nationally oppressed and socially
exploited by Western imperialism for several centuries. In
many of the new developing countries, the idea of national¬
ism is supported by the mass of the people "which aims at
the building of a nation based upon the principles of
liberty, independence, economic justice, and national
^Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial
Question (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 89.
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unity."
Nationalism in the Third World implies the right of
oppressed peoples to self-determination, the right of polit¬
ical separation of these nations from colonialist's direct
control, and the formation of an independent national unity,
and, hence, anti-capitalism. According to Lenin: "The right
of nations to self-determination implies exclusively the
right to independence in the political sense, the right to
. . . . 2
free political separation from the oppressing nation."
Marxists, in their support of the rights of nations and
national minorities to self-determination, feel that the
proletariat has to consolidate its power. "The right to
self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle
to the exercise by the working class of its right to dicta¬
torship."^
A nation according to Stalin "is an historically
constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis
of common language, territory, economic life, and
^Munif al-Razzaz, The Evolution of the Meaning of
Nationalism, trans. Ibrahim Abu Lughod (New York: Doubleday
& Company, Inc., 1963), p. 58.
2
V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, National Colonial
Question (Calcutta: Calcutta Book House, 1970), p. 33.
3
Stalin, Marxism, p. 168.
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psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."^
Depending on these historical characteristics, in most of
the emerging countries, the struggle for liberation is
motivated by a nationalist desire to strengthen the aspira¬
tion of the community, promote an interest in the historical
past, enhance national pride, and stimulate the development
of national character and language. More than that; a
common characteristic of the emerging countries is a desire
to improve the living standard of the peasantry and the
working class.
Meanwhile, obtaining political independence and
establishing a state is not the end of the struggle of the
national problem. The question of national minorities,
socio-economic measures (nationalization, agrarian reforms,
industrialization), and their implementation are extremely
difficult and require mass education and mobilization to
deal with them, over a long period of time.
Today, there are two major trends of nationalism
among the emerging countries; the bourgeois-democratic move¬
ment and the national-liberation movement. One trend is
reformist, the other is revolutionary. In evaluating these
two major trends of nationalism, which differ radically from
^Lenin and Stalin, National Colonial, p. 68.
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each other as far the national movement in the Third World
is concerned, it is important to ask what class they repre¬
sent, in what sort of conditions and directions they are
implementing the socio-economic plans, and what type of
government they are promoting.
The right-wing bourgeois democrats as a class are in
a coalition with the imperialist forces and the big land¬
lords at home. They are not in fundamental contradiction
with each other, and refuse to be played against one another.
The imperialist forces count on the cooperation of the
bourgeois class to maintain the social conditions under
their control and direction. They are against any radical
changes in the existing socio-economic conditions for they
fear to lose the high profits they make and share at the
expense of the mass of the people. In return for loans and
aid they get from the neo-colonialists, the bourgeois forces
faithfully hold back the national-liberation struggle. The
imperialist forces know they have an interest in supporting
and maintaining the bourgeoisie in leadership position. For
the ultimate goal of the bourgeoisie is to have the state
serve and protect its interest and the interest of certain
privileged groups or nationalities. As Stalin says:
It became obvious that the emancipation of the toiling
masses of the oppressed nationalities and the abolition
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of national oppression were inconceivable without a
break with imperialism, without the overthrow by each
of its 'own' national bourgeoisie and the assumption
of power by the toiling masses themselves.^
There is just no way that the bourgeoisie will be willing to
sacrifice its interest and its wealth for the interest of
the peasantry and the working class. The bourgeois as a
class proved its inability to solve the national problem.
It cannot be a strategic ally of the toiling masses. It is
the agents of capitalism. They are against any revolution
which aims at eliminating the influence of imperialism and
destroys all forms of exploitation. Nonetheless, it is
necessary for this class to struggle against certain aspects
of national oppression especially in getting political inde¬
pendence, in order to extend their influence and to further
its interests as a class. They often come forward to
champion the cause of their people, and thus, rally the
mass of the people behind them. On the other hand, the
bourgeoisie will not allow these struggles to go beyond
limited reform within the capitalist system.
As to the national-liberation movement in the Third
World countries, its objectives are quite different from the
bourgeois-democratic movement. One of its main objectives
^Stalin, Marxism, p. 70.
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is a rejection of both capitalism and national oppression.
Another is the formation of a united-democratic front of
oppressed people under the joint leadership of all revolu¬
tionary forces. This unity is not based on the dictatorship
or the political dominance of a small portion of the popula¬
tion over the great majority, but a unity of all progressive
forces in a broad democratic system. To this effect Mao
says: "It is the political power of all who support both
resistance and democracy, i.e., the joint democratic dicta¬
torship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors
and reactionaries."^ For Mao, these reactionaries and
traitors have no voice in the national-democratic state.
"...democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reac-
2
tionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship." For
as long as there is private ownership, there is disunity
among the people of the nation, and there is national
oppression against certain unprivileged groups.
Consequently, in finding a correct approach to the
solution of the nationality problem, Marxism argues that
there must be a revolutionary party built on the theory of
scientific socialism. This party has two major tasks: one
^Mao, Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 427.
^Ibid., vol. 4, p. 418.
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internal, the other external.
Internally, its task is to form a united front of
all revolutionary forces who can be united to defeat capital¬
ism and imperialism. Since the working class in the emerg¬
ing countries is numerically small, it is impossible to
achieve a proletarian revolution without union with the
oppressed mass of the people, but at the same time, the pro¬
letariat must maintain its independence and leadership of
the united front. Mao says: "At the same time, every party
and group in the united front must preserve its ideological,
political and organizational independence;..."^ Thus, it is
important to mobilize the broad mass of the people and be
concerned about their interest in the liberation struggle
for a "New Democracy." In this way you guarantee the suc¬
cess of oppressed people from the evils of imperialism and
other reactionary forces.
Externally, the task is to form an alliance with
advanced socialist countries who will treat them as equal
and who are willing to support their political independence
as well as their economic independence. This firm socialist
alliance is important for the emerging countries since they
lack industrial proletarian power, and want to develop from
^Ibid., vol. 2, p. 200.
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primitive forms of economy to a socialist economy without
the industrial capitalist stage. This international support
has been effective in the success and advancement of the
nationalist democracy of China, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria and
many other nationalist-democratic movements and nations in
the Third World.
Today the imperialist economic and political powers
are diminishing as a result of the growing influence of the
Third World countries and their solidarity on international
cooperation and international organization for progressive
change.
Marxist-Leninists have always considered the national-
liberation movement an important element of a single
world-wide revolutionary process, a powerful force
battering down the defences of imperialism. They work
on the assumption that three important revolutionary
movements exist in the world today, namely, the world
socialist system, the international working class move¬
ment, and the national-liberation revolutions. If the
anti-imperialist struggle is to win, the three forces
must achieve unity and work in close contact and
cooperation. The world-wide liberation movement will
win out if the three forces achieve close alliance...^
To summarize the three basic forms of democratic
societies we have; (1) liberal democracy which reflects his¬
torically the interest of the emerging bourgeoisie;
^Y. Zhukov, L. Delyusin, A. Iskenderov, L. Stepanov,
The Third World (Moscow; Progress Piiblishers, 1970), pp. 33-
34.
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(2) collectivist democracy which reflects historically the
interest of the emerging working class of industrial
society, i.e., "the grave diggers of the bourgeoisie"r and
(3) national democracy which reflects the common interest of
all oppressed elements of colonial society in its efforts to
obtain freedom from external control.
After analyzing different types of democracy, we
will now discuss and demonstrate why the nationalist-
democratic society is the most applicable for the solution
of the national problem. A review of the literature^ on the
national question provides us with a number of strategic
variables and the way these variables are combined for a
successful nationalist-democratic society. These major
variables are: (1) a people centered ideology; (2) partici¬
pation and consent; (3) leadership; (4) unity, and (5) dis¬
cipline (revolutionary party).
A people centered ideology
One of the basic conditions for the emergence of
successful democracy is to have a clear cause applicable to
the needs of the great majority of the people—a cause that
^V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-
Determination (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), pp. 5-65.
First published in 1947.
32
is easy to understand and worth dedication and sacrifice.
For any national government or national movement that wants
to achieve radical changes has to take into account the
interest of the people, i.e., the great majority. Since in
most of the Third World countries, the peasantry (which
constitutes the great majority) has been almost illiterate,
their political awareness has been small. It stands to
reason, therefore, that an intensified education program
among the peasantry is needed in order to strengthen the
political independence and achieve economic independence.
It is the responsibility of the state or the cadres
of a party to go to all sections of the society and educate
the masses on what is necessary for them to believe in if
they want to free themselves from poverty, ignorance, isola¬
tion and frustration. More than that: it is to establish a
friendly relation with the people, help them at their work
and teach them how they can improve their living standard.
It is necessary to show concern and sincerity about their
aims and ideals. Above all, it is necessary to counteract
the enemy, i.e., imperialism and capitalism. All this has
to be done in a clear and simple language, so the people can
understand. Through this understanding, they can get a
better picture of themselves and their enemy. Mao says:
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We should go to the masses and learn from them, synthe¬
size their experience into better, articulated princi¬
ples and methods, then do propaganda among the masses,
and call upon them to put these principles and methods
into practice so as to solve their problems and help
them achieve liberation and happiness.^
Participation and consent
Participation, according to a Lebanese socialist
writer Clovis Maqsud, is the sharing of responsibility by
the people in political, economic, social, and cultural
activities as best suited to the particular conditions of
their society. Consent is the acceptance by the individual
of the rules of authority. It must be unanimous and express
2
the general will of the people.
From these two definitions, participation could mean
two things: active participation and passive participation.
Participation by those who have influence on the policy
decision is active and participation by those who agree with
the decisions and planning made by their representatives is
passive.
Under the colonial regime, the colonizer disapproved
of mass participation in politics, because it led to popular
sovereignty. It was the Third World nationalist who
^Mao, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 158.
2
Gendzier, A Middle East Reader, pp. 97-98.
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advocated mass participation. Mass participation was needed
to gain a legitimate political independence from alien domi¬
nation. Some of the newly independent states of the Third
World had no desire of mass support—they could use the
authority of the ex-colonial government by holding back the
national liberation struggle. Other emerging governments
realize their inability to control and develop the national
economy without the support of imperialism and thus sought
the support of the masses and took an active part in carrying
out the programme of national construction. They found it
necessary to set up a political organization that would
reflect the interest of the majority of the population.
Without the participation of the masses in the govern¬
ment, democratization of the political and social system of
government is incomplete and incapable of shouldering the
revolutionary responsibility. Social progress should involve
the interest of the mass of the people. That is to say, it
is impossible to build a nationalist-democratic state and
carry out a social revolution without the people's participa¬
tion. Lenin says: "The strength of the national movement is
determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the
nation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it."
^Lenin and Stalin, National Colonial, p. 73.
1
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In some of the Third World countries, mass partici¬
pation refers to intellectuals. That is the case where most
of the peasantry are illiterate and their socio-economic
level is weak compared to the advanced nationalist-democratic
countries. In this case democratic forces would not be so
effective and it requires a period of transition with a
sincere effort from the state or party.
The political regimes of the countries of Asia and
Africa differ greatly among themselves. There are
countries where the democratic forces can be an active
factor of political life, take part in state leadership
or exercise important influence thereon; and there are
others where the democratic forces have little or no
opportunity for such activity.^
As world-wide consciousness of the struggle grows, fewer and
fewer of the latter would eventually be the ideal.
Leadership
Democratic centralism is the basic method by which
most revolutionary parties of this age have been successful.
The validity of the party's principle depends not only on the
correctness of the theoretical approach, but also on its
validity in principle.
Democracy inside any party means the right of every
member to know the party's strategy, political stand.
^Zhukov, et al.. The Third World, p. 55.
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planning, and the right to voice his or her opinion on any
matter concerning the party's theoretical and practical
activities, within the limits of the party's security. It
is the duty of the leaders to listen to every member, to
consider his or her opinion, to accept self-criticism, and
to correct faulty actions through dialogue, discussion and
persuasion. Democracy inside the party helps members feel
that the party is theirs and that they are its protectors.
Another aspect of democracy within a party is the collective
leadership. Collective leadership secures and prevents
authoritarian rule by one individual or a small section of
the party. It also guarantees a certain measure of self-
control over the members of leadership and helps them to view
things from more than one angle so that the party's stand
might be stronger and more effective.
Another aspect of democracy within a party is the
member's right to express his or her thought of the leaders
and the way they handle their responsibility. It gives the
members of the party the right to support or withhold their
confidence in leadership, or the power to change the party's
leadership when it is shown that the leadership is no longer
capable of carrying on its responsibility. Members' support
and confidence enable the leadership to be more effective
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in mobilizing the party's members, maintaining discipline
within the party's rank-and-file and creating an atmosphere
of brotherhood and unity. Democratization among the party
members is the objective control over the leaders' actions
and sense of responsibility, and encourages the leadership
to do better.
Unity and discipline (revolutionary party)
Unity within a party is considered one of the basic
prerequisites for uniting the whole country.^ The party has
very important roles to play in leading the mass of the
people. Its leadership and members must be conscious of
people's needs and willing to dedicate themselves to the
interest of the mass of the people. They should be armed
not only with revolutionary thought, but also with disci¬
pline. "The party must see to it that its member...consti¬
tute an example and a vanguard in conscience, activity,
2
sacrifice, and discipline." Its leadership and members
must be recruited from the mass of the people and be loyal
representatives for their people's cause. The leadership
also must be in close relation with the people, live with
^Mao, Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 210.
^PFLP, A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine
(Amman: Information Department, 1969), p. 104.
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them and rely on them. Mao says:
However active the leading groups may be, their activity
will amount to fruitless effort by a handful of people
unless combined with activity of the masses. On the
other hand, if the masses alone are active without a
strong leading group to organize their activity properly,
such activity cannot be sustained for long, or carried
forward in the right direction, or raised to high
levels
The main objective of the party is to gain political
and social freedom for the mass of the people, protect their
rights, and life, and guarantee their future. It is to
solve the problem of the people, to raise their political
awareness and to help them get organized. It is the party's
responsibility to mobilize the mass of the people and to be
supported by the mass of the people, i.e., the great
majority.
^Mao, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 118.
CHAPTER II
ZIONISM, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
NATIONALISM
The origins of Zionism as an ideology and a political
movement are found in the economic, political and social
forces of the late 19th century in Europe. Zionism's main
objective was the establishment of a Jewish state in
Palestine^ which would gather all the Jews of the world.
This gathering was to be a solution to the "Jewish problem."
It was planned and financed by well established, wealthy
2
European Jews. They were attracted to Zionism because it
^Palestine is the territory the Zionist movement
occupied in 1948-1949, the West Bank (annexed by the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan after the 1948 war, then by the Israelis
in the 1967 June war), and the Gaza Strip. Palestine is
about the size of the state of Vermont in the U.S., with a
total land area of 10,163 square miles. In addition, there
is an inland water area of 272 square miles comprising Lake
Huleh (5 square miles), Lake Tiberias or the sea of Galilee
(62 square miles) and half of the area of the Dead Sea (450
square miles), making a total area of 10,435 square miles.
2
Ahmad El Kodsy and Eli Lobel, The Arab World and
Israel (New York: Monthly Review, 1970), pp. 106-110.
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was a solution to their own problems. This idea provided
them with an outlet to invest some of their capital and
reduce anti-Semitism in Europe.^
Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) is considered the founder
of the Zionist movement. In his native Vienna, Herzl had
been concerned with the problem of anti-Semitism. However,
it was not until he, as a correspondent of the Viennese
Neue Freie Presse in Paris, covered the trial of a Jewish
officer in the French Army, Alfred Dreyfus, that Herzl be¬
came strongly convinced that Jews must have their own state
in order to protect their political and economic rights.
After the Dreyfus trial, Herzl wrote Per Judestaat (The Jew
State) in 1896 "vhich has come to be looked upon as the
source book of Zionism, as Karl Marx's Kapital is of
2
Socialism." In this book, Herzl outlined the scope of the
Zionist movement; the creation of a Jewish state; the search
for an available non-European territory to create a state;
^Anti-Semitism played an important role in the crys¬
tallization of the Zionist movement. By opposing the assim¬
ilation of Jews, it encouraged their isolation in European
societies. It also resulted from an economic crisis mainly
for petty bourgeois Jews and workers from keen competition
among all sectors of the economy of Western Europe at the
end of the 19th century.
2
Jessie Sampter, Modern Palestine (New York: Hadassah,
The Women's Zionist Organization of America, 1933), p. 372.
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the displacement of the indigenous population which is
neither Jewish nor European; and the building of a state on
the European model, secured through allying with the Western
1
powers.
Herzl's writings were designed to appeal to the
Jewish upper classes, those with money and power to back up
his plans for the Jewish state- He promised the European
Jewish upper classes a profitable investment; to the assim¬
ilated Jewish bourgeoisie he promised that migration of the
Jewish masses would result in greater tolerance for them;
and to the Jewish middle and lower classes he promised
2
positions as officials in a future state. On the other
hand, for the proletarian immigrants he envisioned a
military-style society based on contract and indentured
labor.^
The writings of Herzl form the ideological basis for
the present-day Israeli right and center parties and the
^Theodore Herzl, A Jew State (London, 1896), Chapter
II. Further Zionist writings combining historical develop¬
ment of the Zionist ideology are collected in The Zionist
Idea; A Historical Analysis and Reader, ed. Arthur Hertzberg





Jewish Agency. The Israeli left parties and the Histadrut
find their basis in the "Socialist Zionism" of Ber Borochov,
a Russian Jew (1881-1917). After he was expelled from the
Russian Social-Democratic Party for putting the needs of
Jewish workers before those of the proletariat as a whole,
Ber Borochov began to work for the Zionist organization.
His ideas are essentially the same as those of Herzl. He
argues that given the case of "landless nation" such as the
Jews, a national problem arises which hinders the class
struggle but gives rise to a national solidarity among all
classes of that nation. It follows that the solution of the
"national problem" takes precedence over class struggle.
The solution of the "Jewish national problem" is migration,
and for Ber Borochov to Palestine in particular. "The ideal
of political autonomy for the Jews will be consummated by
This agency is the organizational backbone of
Zionism. One of its various activities is fund-raising
among Jewish communities all over the world.
2
Histadrut or The General Organization of Jewish
Workers in Palestine was founded in 1922 by the Zionist left
as an instrument for creating the Jewish proletariat. Today
it owns nearly all economic branches in Israel. It owns a
giant industry, banks, shipping, airline companies, the
largest construction firm in Israel, and the largest health
insurance system. Ninety percent of the Jewish workers in
Israel are members of the trade unions run by Histadrut. It
was not established for organizing the Jewish class but for
creating it. Arab workers were not accepted as members as a
matter of principle; the Histadrut was for Jews only.
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political territorial autonomy in Palestine."'^
Ber Borochov justified his separation of the strug¬
gle of the Jewish working class from that of the rest of the
working class by pointing out that Jewish workers were gen¬
erally excluded from many enterprises, and as such not at
the center of the means of production. He thought that the
Jewish proletariat should struggle against the Jewish
bourgeoisie, and that this struggle could only take place
successfully in the context of a Jewish state in Palestine.
In 1897, in the meeting of the First Zionist Orga¬
nization in Basle, Switzerland, the following Zionist
strategy was suggested: (1) the promotion of organized large
scale Jewish colonization of Palestine; (2) the acquisition
of an internationally recognized legal rights to colonize
Palestine; and (3) the formation of a permanent organiza-
2
tion to unite all Jews in the cause of Zionism.
Consequently, the Zionist Organization started on
two things: First, they sought to obtain international
^Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea, p. 366. See also "The
Class Struggle and the National Question," in Hertzberg's
book. This anthology provides a good summary of Borochov's
ideas and includes some of his original works.
2
David Waines, The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine,
1897-1971 (Montreal: Chateau Books Limited Publishers, 1971),
p. 29.
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recognition of their right to colonize Palestine. Second,
they started to set up offices, elect officials and collect
financial aid to set up exclusive Jewish agricultural
colonies in Palestine.
The legal right was sought from the imperial powers
of Europe—the Kaiser of Germany, the Ottoman Sultan
(Palestine was still subject to the Ottomans) and the
British Government.
The British Government at first suggested territory
in Uganda, but "the outbreak of war in 1914 ended all hope
that settlements in Africa could be affected but opened
entirely new possibilities with regard to Palestine."^ As
the First World War approached, the British Government's
interest in the division of the Ottoman empire increased,
and Chaim Wiezmann(a leading Zionist) appealed to the
British concerns;
We can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within
the sphere of influence, and should British encourage
Jewish settlement there, as a British dependency, we
could have in twenty or thirty years a million Jews out
there, perhaps more; they would develop the country,
bring back civilization to it and form a very effective
guard to the Suez Canal.^
^Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed.. The Transformation of
Palestine, "Zionism as Western Imperialism" (Evanston;
Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 39.
2Chaim Wiezmann, Trial and Error (New York; Harper &
Brothers, 1949), p. 149.
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Britain accepted the Zionist plan to colonize
Palestine. Such colonization would secure Britain's polit¬
ical and economic control in the Arab world; it would also
serve as a buffer zone between Syria and Egypt. Besides,
Britain needed Jewish financial support and man-power for
the allied cause. The creation of a Jewish state would also
clear the Western guilt feelings about the Jews.
Furthermore, Britain and France had imperialist aims
in the Arab World. Britain's aim was to set up an Arab
Kingdom under her control because of the strategic location
of the area as a route to India and to the oil in the Arab
peninsula. France's aim was to maintain her traditional
cultural and economic interests, and to balance the British
influence in the Arab world. The result was the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of 1916 in which Britain and France divided up
Turkish-held territory between themselves.^
The following year, 1917, Britain issued the Balfour
Declaration as appeasement to the Zionists who were seeking
^Sir Mark Sykes (1873-1919), a British advisor to
the Foreign Office on the Near Eastern affairs, and Charles
Georges-Picot, formerly French Counsel in Beirut, prepared a
draft agreement in 1915-1916 about the post-war division of
the Middle East, which was also approved in principle by
Russia. France was to control over Lebanon and Syria, the
British that of Iraq and Transjordan. Palestine was to be
under international administration. For the text of the
Sykes-Picot Agreement, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the
Near and Middle East, vol. 2, p. 19.
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the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine:
His Majesty's Government views with favour the estab¬
lishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish
Race, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object; it being clearly under¬
stood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
the civil and religious rights of the existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and
political status enjoyed in any other country by such
Jews who are fully contented with their existing
nationality and citizenship.^
Ironically enough, Britain and France also gave a
promise to Arab nationalists who were seeking independence
from Turkish domination. Both Britain and France claimed in
the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918 that their policy was
aimed at "the setting up of national governments and admin¬
istrations that shall derive their authority from the free
exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous
2
population."
After the war and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
however, the next development was that Britain and France
divided up the Ottoman-held territories despite the rights
and aspirations of Arab nationalists and contrary to their
previous promises and declarations to Arab leaders. Britain
^Quoted in Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-
1922, Seeds of Conflict (New York; George Braziller, 1973),
pp. 12-13.
2
Quoted in Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel;
1917-1948 (London; Collins, 1965), p. 5.
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imposed her mandates over the Arab people of Iraq, Palestine
and Transjordan; France imposed her mandates over Lebanon
and Syria. Arabs continued to demand absolute freedom,
independence and self-government, and denounced the separa¬
tion of Palestine from Syria.
The British mandate over Palestine was the most re¬
actionary and inhumane of all the allied mandates in the
area. The mandate failed to recognize the principles stip¬
ulated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, namely, that Palestine—like Lebanon, Syria and
Iraq—was entitled to be "provisionally recognized" as an
independent state. Nor did the mandate take into account
the pledges of support of independence made previously to
the Arabs by the allies. Instead, Palestinian rights and
self-determination were deliberately denied to suit the
imperialist and colonialist ambitions of Britain and Zionism.
Britain felt it her right and responsibility to take from
the Palestinian Arab people and to give to the European
Jewish people under the pledge of the Balfour Declaration.
When British military forces and police administra¬
tion took control over Palestine in 1918, there were only
56,000 Jews in Palestine most of them immigrants driven out
of various European countries and opposed to political
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Zionism. Arabs were about 644,000 and owned 97 per cent of
the land.^ Contrary to the Zionist propaganda that Palestine
was a desert occupied by a few nomadic savages, it was not
"a country without a people for people without a country."
On November 13, 1974 Yassir Arafat, a chairman of the
Palestine Liberation Organization and a leader of the
Palestine Revolution had responded to the Zionist myth of
Palestine in his historic speech at the UN:
Mr. President, it pains our people greatly to witness
the propagation of the myth that its homeland was a
desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of
foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people
and that the colonialist entity caused no harm to any
human being. No, Mr. President, such lies must be
exposed from this rostrum. For the world must know
that Palestine was the cradle for the most ancient
cultures and civilizations. Her Arab people were
engaged in farming and building, spreading culture
throughout the land for thousands of years, setting
an example in the practice of freedom of worships,
acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all
religions
The ideology of Zionism had worked in congruence
with 20th century racist and imperialist ideology of the
West. In 1920 America implicitely accepted the League of
Nations charter which allowed Britain's mandate over
Palestine with full knowledge about the Balfour Declaration.
•'"Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine
1945-1946, pp. 144, 242.
'The Palestine Voice, vol. 4, no. 5, p. 4.
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Under the mandate Britain assisted the Zionists in building
a state within a state, allowing Jews everywhere to enter
Palestine legally and illegally and against the consent of
the Palestinian people. The aim of this Jewish migration
to Palestine was not to enable them to live under equal
political and social rights with the Palestinian people.
The goal was to develop exclusive Jewish organizations,
Jewish labor, and Jewish military forces in order to usurp
Palestine from its indigenous Arab population and to exploit
all Palestine.
In 1929 the Jewish Agency proclaimed that all land
was to be acquired in the name of the Jewish National Fund
and was to be held "as the inalienable property of the
Jewish people." Further, it adopted an exclusivist labor
policy that allowed as a "matter of principle" only Jewish
labor in the Agency's various undertakings, including
agricultural colonies. This policy served both the terri¬
torial and the expulsionist aims of Zionism. Thus, the
kibbutzim were developed as outposts of Zionist settlement
in various strategic territories, organized along communal,
but especially military, lines.^
^Peter Buch, "The Myth of Progressive Israel," The
Militant (July 10, 1967).
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The Palestinian Arabs interpreted these British
policies as designed to exclude Arabs from Palestine, and
Arab opposition was firm and determined during the mandate
period throughout the land. The Arabs came to fear that the
Jews would be the majority if Britain continued helping Jews
enter Palestine and the transfer of lands continued. They
also feared that their right to self-determination was more
and more endangered by the mandate and its support of the
institution of a Jewish national home. The first country¬
wide revolt was in April, 1920? the second in May, 1921; and
the third in August, 1929.
Therefore, the Arab Palestinian revolts are easy to
trace. They centered around: (1) the immediate suspension
of Jewish immigration; (2) the prohibition of the transfer
of Arab lands to the Jews; (3) the recognition of the Arab
right to self-determination, and (4) the formation of a
democratic government.^
When appeals, protests, arguments, demonstrations
and local riots failed to move the British Government to
respect Arab rights or even to fulfill British pledges to
the Arabs, in April 1936 an Arab High Committee was formed
^Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine,
Part I, pp. 33, 185.
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in Palestine and a general strike was called "with the
admitted aim of bringing Jewish immigration and trade to a
standstill.
The strike lasted six months and Arab guerrillas
began to operate in Palestine. They saw their hope in
ousting Great Britain before the immigrants became strong
enough to declare a Zionist state. Britain responded by
arming and organizing Zionist groups to fight the
Palestinians. Besides, the Jewish colony's establishment
took advantage of the strike to gain control of government
administration, public services and parts of the Arab econ¬
omy. These moves in conjunction with the new inflow of
labor and capital from Europe left the Arab economic insti¬
tutions at a major disadvantage, while greatly strengthening
the Zionist colony's economy. Indeed the economy of
Palestine was still dominated in the industrial and manufac¬
turing sector by Britain in favor of its own imports.
The Arab revolt against Britain continued after the
strike, and in 1937 the British administration proposed a
partition of Palestine into two ethnic states, with a
ceiling on Jewish immigration and the forcible removal of
^Michael Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet; A Biography
of Ben Gurion, trans. Len Ortzen (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 53.
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the Arab population from the Zionist state. The Palestinian
rejected it and their rebellion intensified as illegal
Jewish immigration increased. These Jews, now leaving
Europe because of the Nazis, were refused entry by the
Western nations. The Zionist establishment opposed immigra¬
tion into any place other than Palestine, though the Jewish
communities in most of the world did not yet view Palestine
as their homeland.^
By the end of 1939 Britain had defeated the
Palestinian revolt (see Chapter III), but the war in Europe
was at hand and large portions of the British Army were still
tied down in Palestine. In order to quiet the Palestinians
and gain Arab support for the allied cause, Britain modified
her stand by issuing what is known as the White Paper, the
Mac-Donald Memorandum, which states:
1. That the Jewish National Home as envisaged in the
Balfour Declaration and in previous statements of
British policy had been established;
2. That to develop it further against Arab wishes would
be a violation of Britain's undertakings to the
Arabs, and that such a policy could only be carried
out by the use of unjustifiable force;
3. That, therefore, after the admission of a final quota
of 75,000 more Jewish immigrants over a period of
five years, Jewish immigration should stop;
^Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel, pp. 227-228.
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4. That during this period of five years, a restriction
should be placed on the acquisition of further land
in Palestine by the Jews; and
5. That at the end of the period of five years, self-
governing institutions should be set up in the
country.^
Meanwhile, Zionists also turned away from Britain
for the following reasons:
1. Britain's foothold in the area started declining; and
2. Britain's threat to Zionist dreams in Palestine.
Consequently, during the Second World War, Zionist
leaders turned for support to the United States as a result
of its rise in world politics and economics. Ben Gurion
stated:
For my part, I had no doubt that the center of gravity
for our political efforts had shifted from Great Britain
to America, who was making sure of being the world's
leading power, and where the greatest number of Jews as
well as the most influential were to be found.^
Zionist groups in the United States began a vigorous
campaign to gain public support for a Zionist state in
Palestine. The strong appeal to United State's interest
came from some Zionist leaders directly to General Patrick
Hurley, Roosevelt's representative, who described their
^Quoted in Sami Hadawi, Palestine In Focus (Beirut:
Palestine Research Center, 1969), pp. 33-34.
2
Quoted in Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet, p. 64.
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program as a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine with the
transfer of Arab population to Iraq and "Jewish leadership
for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic develop¬
ment and control."^
The Second World War also gave Zionism an opportuniiY
to build up their economic institutions. Palestine was a
major British base when supply lines to Europe were dis¬
rupted. Jewish industry had been organized by outside sup¬
port through the influx from Europe, and so was in position
to respond to the British Army's needs and to grow vastly.
Arab industry was underdeveloped and unable to benefit sig¬
nificantly. Jewish production doubled between the years
1939-1942, with especially spectacular gains in the diamond
processing industry due to the distruption in transport of
raw materials from Southern Africa to Belgium. Contributions
continued to come from America and new organizations such as
Ampal (American-Palestinian) and the Sonneborn Institute
paid for shipments of industrial equipment to Palestine and
financed the building of an arms industry there.
The full force of political Zionism had come to be
concentrated in the US since Britain had proved intrac¬
table. It was evident that only the militant leadership
^U.S. Government, Foreign Relation of the US; 1943,
Near East and Africa, vol. 1, pp. 776-777.
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of American Zionism could weight the scales in favour
of the Zionists once more.^
Intense feelings in the wake of the Nazi extermina¬
tion camps, of course, favoured the Zionist movement, and
the Zionist establishment seized the opportunity and re¬
sponded to the Nazi Government in finding a solution to the
Jewish problem by proclaiming Palestine the only secure home
for Jews. The Zionist campaign in America had created the
impression that only a national state could give security to
the refugees. United States President Harry Truman became
convinced that this solution served justice and that it
2
"would help to alleviate the refugee situation." Therefore,
he urged Attlee to allow 100,000 more immigrants. Hints of
financial sanctions against Britain were given, if the
British Government did not comply. The United States
Congress called for a Jewish state in Palestine along
3
Zionist lines. The United States reacted more favorably to
the idea of a Zionist ruling class interest as an ally of
America, and felt confident that such a course would bring
^Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and the US
Foreign Policy (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), p. VIII.
2
Alfred M. Lilienthal, VBaat Price Israel (Chicago;
Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 28.
^Ibid., p. 34.
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stability in the area, a major concern of the US Government.
Washington presumed that the Zionist leaders could establish
their state and that the Arabs would eventually accept the
status quo. In this way the area would be diffused without
any great threat to the economy and political interests of
the United States.
Up to this point (1947) the Zionist goals had not
been reached for the territory was not yet in Zionist hands,
the local Arab population was still there, and no state
existed. Even the program of the First Zionist Congress had
not achieved all its plans, for a large number of Jewish
immigrants had not come, and Jews throughout the world were
not enthusiastic in their support of Zionism. The plight of
the survivors of the Nazis, however, offered new promise to
the Zionist cause.
On February 14, 1947 Britain referred the mandate to
the UN for disposition with full knowledge that the Zionist
forces were well armed and trained to wrest Palestine from
its Arab people.
On November 29, 1947 the UN voted a recommendation
for partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and
one Arab. All questions of the violation of Arab
Palestinians' national rights by imposing partition were
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rejected. The United States wielded great pressure upon
certain UN small nations of the Third World, such as Liberia,
Haiti and the Philippines who at first opposed the move, but
later voted in favor of the partition.
By supporting the Partition resolution of 1947 (and
making its passage to bear on the Latin American states,
as well as on the Philippines and Liberia, who voted in
favor of it), the US in effect signed the birth certif¬
icate of the Zionist state.^
The Jewish area created by the UN Partition plan was
forty-nine per cent Arab in population, while some Jewish
settlements were in the Arab territory. Britain was to
leave on May 15, 1948 and considerable pressure would be
needed to oust the Palestinians by that time if a state was
to be created. A war effort was planned by the Zionists,
and large sums of money came from outside sources, mainly
from the Zionist organizations in the United States. The
British Administration had already armed and trained the
Zionist forces during and after the Arab revolts of the 30's
The Palestinian resistance was inefficient, partly as a
result of their defeat by the British army in 1939, from
which they had not been allowed to recover. The British
Administration prevented the Palestinians from getting
^Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel—The Lethal
Dilemma (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 31-32.
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outside assistance. The Palestinian leadership was exiled
in 1939 and was kept in exile until the British withdrew.
On April 1, 1948 before the British forces withdrew
from Palestine, Zionist forces started their terrorist
attack on Arab villages killing and expelling their inhabi¬
tants mercilessly in order to gain control of the area
allotted to them by the UN Partition. Within a few days,
thousands of Arab Palestinians started seeking refuge in
neighboring Arab countries. In essence, it was Zionist
policy to drive Palestinians of all classes out of their
fields, businesses, villages and towns. In the process of
these terrorist actions on the night of April 10, 1948, two
hundred and fifty-four Arab old men, women and children were
slaughtered by the Zionists (the Irgun) in the village of
Deir Yassin.^ Menachim Begin, the leader of the Irgun,
wrote that there would not have been a state of Israel with-
2
out the victory at Deir Yassin.
In the midst of this Zionist military and terrorist
methods against the Arab Palestinian, Truman promised
^David Waines, The Unholy War; Israel and Palestine,
1897-1971 (Montreal: Cahateau Books Limited, Publishers,
1971), p. 107.
2 . .
Menachim Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun (New
York: Henry Schuman, 1951), p. 162.
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Weizmann that he would recognize the state as soon as it was
proclaimed. Such assurances encouraged Zionist efforts, and
the expulsion of Arabs continued in great numbers until May
14, 1948. On that date Ben-Gurion declared the state of
Israel and minutes "earlier" it was recognized by the United
States.
The next day a feeble gesture was made by the Arab
governments, still colonial regimes under the control of
Britain and France, to prevent the expulsion of Palestinians.
These Arab leaders urged the Palestinian people to stay and
resist. Fighting went on for less than a month between a
combined Arab force of 21,000 opposing a Zionist military
force of 60,000. The aim of the Arab force was only to
check the advance of the Zionist armies. A cease fire came
into being on June 11, and the UN mediator. Counte Folke
Bernadotte, called for a return of the Palestinians who had
fled. Ben-Gurion replied, "we must do everything to ensure
that they never do return."^ Shortly after, Counte Folke
Bernadotte was killed by the Zionists.
By January, 1949, Israel not only had the land given
to the Zionist colony by the UN Partition, but almost 30 per¬
cent of the land given to the Palestinians whose nuitiber in
^Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet, p. 148.
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the occupied areas was reduced to 150,000 while the number
of Palestinian refugees mounted to over 900,000. The
majority of these refugees left their homes with what little
possessions they were able to carry with them. They went
into four directions: about half of them to Jordan, 33 per¬
cent to Gaza Strip, 12 percent to Lebanon and 11 percent to
Syria. In all these Arab countries, Palestinian refugees
lived in crowded caves and shabby tents with inadequate
health, housing and education. Thousands died from lack of
food and other basic necessities of life. The rest of
Palestine (the West Bank) had been annexed by King Abdullah
of Transjordan to create the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
which increased the population of his kingdom by over 60 per¬
cent .
The Zionist state now got recognition of its exis¬
tence as a state mainly from the big powers. The economic
and political viability of the state was not secure. The
Arabs remaining in Israel presented a contradiction to the
ethnic and class structure of the state. The land and its
resources were desired, but a Jewish labor force was still
the goal. The Zionist government, therefore, continued its
earlier policy: obtaining land from the Arabs and seeking
more Jewish immigrants. None of these concerns were (or are
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now) directed to freeing the general population from domi¬
nation of a few, for they involve either continued violation
of Palestinian rights or advancement of the interests of
certain classes at the expense of the majority of the
peoples of the Middle East, including most Israeli Jews.
Yet these have been the concerns that shaped Israel since
1948 in its consistent development as a Zionist enterprise.
Forcible military expulsion had been and continues
to be the principal means used to obtain Arab lands prior to
the establishment of the state and had reduced the population
to 10 percent of the total Israeli population. Other means
were developed, however, suited to expropriate in a less
crude way.^ Laws were instituted to confiscate property
from "absent" Arabs, though some of them were still in the
2
country. in order to carry out this confiscation, 75 per¬
cent of the Palestinian population in Israel was placed
under a military government that had extensive powers, e.g.,
expulsion, curfew, restricted areas and movement permits.
The decision to use these powers was at the discretion of
the military Governor "to secure the safety of the people,
the security of Israel, the maintenance of public order, the
^Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs In Israel (Beirut: Institute
for Palestinian Studies, 1969), p. 6.
^Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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suppression of risings, revolts or rebellions, or the supply
of provisions and vital services to the people."^ The
military Governor was a pervasive presence in Arab life.
The Israeli government continues to repress polit¬
ical activity among the Palestinians. Reinforced by dis¬
crimination in employment, education and services, this
situation has rendered most of the Palestinian population
politically inactive and nearly powerless to challenge the
2
Zionist government's seizure of their land.
The second aspect of the Zionist program to secure
the colony is immigration. The Zionist ideal is that all
Jews of the world will settle in Palestine. The Zionist
leaders started to persuade large Jewish communities to
3
leave Arab countries in fear of future persecutions. The
immigrants from Arab lands, however, have presented special
problems in Israel. They form one-half of the present
Israeli population, but they are different from European
Ashkenazi Jews who rule Israel. They are "orientals,"
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they are Arabs. Within Israel's imperialist society they
1
have become the workers and the poor. The Sephardic
workers live in crowded slums while the Arab workers live in
hovels on the outskirts of Jewish towns. The need for
Jewish immigrants forced the European Zionist establishments
to admit Sephardic communities, but not with ease of mind.
Abba Eban, the former Israeli foreign minister had stated:
One of the greatest apprehensions which afflicts us is
when we contemplate our cultural level with that of the
neighboring world. So far from regarding our immigrants
as a bridge toward our integration with the Arabic¬
speaking world, our object should be to infuse them with
an occidental spirit, rather than to allow them to draw
us into unnatural orientalism.^
The consequence of such racism is the present plight
of the Sephardic Jews, which had expression in demonstra¬
tions by Israeli Black Panthers (a Sephardic group) for
3
civil rights reform. As conflict with the Arab states
subsides, and the ability of the rulers to deflect attention
to outside enemies decreases, the inequities of the class
structure within Israel will become more obvious and the
demystification of Zionism will increase.
^Buch, "The Myth of Progressive Israel."
2




Acceptance by Arab states, however, is still crucial
to the security of the colony and the stability of the area.
The question of Palestinian national and social rights and
the anti-imperialist feelings among Arab masses would not
allow the nationalistic Arab government to accept Israel.
The traditionalist Arab governments could not defy this
trend and survive. The Israeli government hoped that the
United States could persuade the Arab governments to recog¬
nize the status quo. The ability of the United States to
force Arab recognition of the status quo has not improved.
Israel concentrated its efforts on building its military
forces to intimidate the Arab states into recognition, but
instead there was growth in many Arab countries of nation¬
alist regimes. Then in June, 1967, Israel launched a war
to create a new fact which the Arab governments could not
withstand and which the United States could approve as a
step toward stability in the area.
As a result of the June, 1967 war, Israel doubled
the territory it controlled. An additional number of
Palestinians and other Arab inhabitants had been forced to
become refugees, and some for the second time in their life.
According to UN figures, on May 31, 1967 the number of
Palestinian refugees mounted to over two million. This time
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their conditions became worse than they were after the '48
war. Jordan lost its major agricultural and tourist terri¬
tory, the West Bank, and became more crowded with refugees.
As a result of the Zionist seizure of the Golan Heights,
Syria was faced with refugees of her own of over 100,000.
Egypt lost Sinai and its oil production of 200 million
dollars annually and faced the closure of the Suez Canal and
loss of its 350 million dollars annual revenue. The loss of
Sinai also turned some Egyptians into refugees.
The Arab governments were finally faced with the
necessity of recognizing the status quo in order to regain
any land or to avoid yet further defeats.
New colonization by Jewish settlers again started
spreading in newly seized areas, and Palestinians who
remained were again harassed, their houses demolished and
expelled in great numbers. The failure of the Arab govern¬
ments began to reveal to the Arab people their inadequacy
to defend themselves. The resistance among the Palestinians
had grown from a small underground organization in the mid
50's into a serious guerrilla force (the Fedayeen) after
the *67 war. After the defeat of the Arab governments in
1967, the resistance became the center not only of the
Palestinian struggle against control by Western powers, but
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also the synibolic center of the struggle of all Arab people.
And, more significantly, it made recognition of the status
quo by the Arab governments more difficult by expressing the
continuing opposition of the Arab people to Israel.
All in all, the establishment of the state of Israel
was accomplished with the support of the racist and imperi¬
alist ideologies of the twentieth century West. The Zionist
state is a state for Jews, and non-Jews can never be fully
included in the economic, social and political structures of
a Jewish state. In fact, the realization of the Zionist
plan has led Jews from the alienation of the oppressed to
the alienation of the oppressors.
Over two million Arab Palestinian people have been
forced to seek refuge outside their country and more than
half a million Palestinian people live under Zionist national
oppression and are alienated from Israeli-Jewish society by
the in-built discriminatory foundation of the state.
Naturally, it is hated by millions of workers, peasants,
students and refugees both inside and outside its borders.
Not only are the Arabs within Israel harassed by the author¬
ities, but those who speak up for or pursue the goal of a
secular democratic state which would make no distinction
among its citizens on the grounds of race or religion, are
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particularly subject to brutal repression. Furthermore, the
condition of the Palestinian people outside Israel is no
better. Their camps are constantly bombed by the Israeli
Air Force and they lack the basic necessities of life.
For all these reasons, and for others as well, the
Palestinian people resist the old conditions of national
oppression by dependence on either Israel or any Arab state.
They strive to recover their lands, go back to houses they
had to forsake and to live and enjoy their lives like other
human beings. In their spirit of continuing the struggle
against Zionism, imperialism, and capitalism, one can
plainly see their eventual victory. The united national
liberation front of all Palestinians and other Arab revolu¬
tionary forces can never be held back, no matter how hard
the Zionist and their imperialist allies may try. The
Palestinian people are confident that they will go back home




The contemporary Palestinian liberation movements
(PLM)^ differ radically from the previous ones of the 30's
and 40's. They are different in their philosophy, educa¬
tion, determination, leadership and self-reliance. Studying
the conditions under which the previous Palestinian resis¬
tance arose, developed and was finally eliminated might give
us some understanding of the background and development of
the contemporary PLM and possibly help us to foresee its
future.
In the 30's and 40's the Palestinian national
struggle against British occupation and Zionism was domi-
2
nated by semi-feudal and religious families. These
^PLM—the term is used here to refer collectively to
the Resistance Movements, i.e., El-Fateh, (PFLP) Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, (PDFLP) Popular Demo¬
cratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
2
Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, pp. 184-194.
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traditional leaders operated the Palestinian national
struggle through compromise with British administration and
dependency on Arab feudal leaders. They refused to penetrate
the middle and lower level of Arab Palestinians and Jewish
communities for the achievement of a social change by mobi¬
lizing and organizing the Palestinian people. This is be¬
cause of their class interest; they failed to form a united
front of the peasantry, working class and other revolutionary
forces.
There seems little doubt that the political leaders had
only scant understanding of the political uses of
violence. All of them seemed convinced that a solution
could be found once violence was stopped or brought
under control. Inevitably, there was a radical divorce
between the fighters in the field and the politicians
in the cities; for their part, the fighters were content
to leave policy-making to the politicians, and the
politicians were eager to keep political control. No
rational coordination was ever devised between the two
elements
For these leaders' interest was geared toward social
material gained at the expense of the peasantry. Armed
struggle constituted a political and economic threat to the
semi-feudal and religious leaders. Involvement in armed
struggle and obtaining national unity meant a threat to their
political, social and economic interest. Jewish emigration
and Zionist organization which prohibited on principle the
^Ibid., p. 189.
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use of Arab labor, represented a political threat to the
semi-feudal and religious families who preferred to respond
to this threat politically, through compromise and at the
lowest possible cost.^
The peasant armed struggle of the 30's and 40's
remained alien to the political leaders who "conceived the
possibility of achieving self-determination by accommodating
British policy. The best-known example of this strategy was
the leadership's call for the abandonment of the general
strike the beginning of 1939, upon the issuance of the
2
British White Paper." Consequently, the previous
Palestinian revolts could not achieve national unity for a
clear national struggle. The Palestinian national leaders
failed to understand correctly the Palestinian struggle for
self-determination. They were satisfied with demanding the
immediate suspension of Jewish immigration; the prohibition
of transfer of Arab lands to the Jews; an end to the British
occupation of Palestine; and later on the formation of an
independent democratic Palestine state. But there was no
clear conception of strategy. Instead of seeking national
independence, they competed for political position and
^Ibid., p. 186.
2
Merip Reports, no. 28 (May, 1974), p. 4.
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material interests. As such the revolt was doomed. It also
lacked the transformation of political consciousness among
Palestinian people, which is the precondition of a success¬
ful democratic national struggle.
These forces controlled the Palestinian national
struggle until 1948 defeat. After the 1948 defeat, the
Palestinian leadership were either eliminated or transformed
into the ruling class in Jordan. In 1949 in the Ariha
(Jericho) conference^ some Palestinian leaders voted to
merge the West Bank with King Abdullah of Jordan and partic¬
ipated in the social, economic and political structure of
the Hashemite regime. This act was to diffuse the
Palestinian independent national problem into a broad Arab
problem.
Palestine had become an Arab problem during the late
1940s and remained at the center of inter-Arab politics
for the next two decades. During this period, however,
Palestinian organizations, parties, and leadership were
secondary to the plethora of Arab political movements.^
An Arab Palestine partition as assigned in the UN
^Ibid., p. 4.
2
William Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann Mosley Lesch,
The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, A Rand Corporation
Research Study (Berkeley: The University of California,
1973), p. 49.
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Partition plan of 1947^ was not achieved. Instead, an
Egyptian military administration was formed in Gaza Strip,
the West Bank was annexed by the Jordanian Government, the
minority Jewish community in Palestine turned to a majority
and the majority of Arab Palestinians into scattered refugees
in the Arab countries. Palestinian nationalism was suppres¬
sed, though in variant degrees, by all Arab states. In
Jordan Palestinians were granted formal citizenship and some
employment, but the majority of Palestinian refugees were
peasants. Palestinian refugees faced the same difficulties
in Lebanon and Gaza Strip. Both Lebanon and Egypt were
over-populated and had their own social problems. As a
result, they restricted Palestinian movements within their
territories.
In 1950 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was estab¬
lished to construct some housing camps, provide some food,
health and educational facilities. In addition, some
Palestinians found employment in the new developing Arab
The partition of UN Resolution of 29 November, 1947
expressed as a recommendation, divided Palestine into six
principal parts—three of which (56% of the total area) were
reserved for a "Jewish state," and the other three, with the
"enclave of Jaffa" (43%) for an "Arab state." Jerusalem and
environs (0.65%) was to be an "international zone" to be
administered by the UN.
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countries, mainly in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq,
Qatar and Bahrain. But still most Palestinians considered
themselves as displaced people and never forgot the fact
that their social and national rights in Palestine had been
internationally acknowledged.^ As a result Palestinian
organizations were formed in the early 50's which sought to
keep the Palestinian people aware of their just cause in
Palestine and to resist any final settlement between Israel
and the Arab states at the expense of the Palestinians.
Since Palestinians of all classes ended up under
different Arab systems, the Palestine problem became a part
of inter-Arab politics during and after the '48 defeat.
Some Palestinian people became active under the influence of
some Arab political movements, mainly national Arab parties
such as the Ba'athist movement, the Nasserite movement and
other Arab Nationalist movements which advocated Arab unity
^On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly of the
UN passed resolution 194, paragraph 11 which said; "..(Pal¬
estinian) refugees... should be permitted to return to their
homes and live in peace with their neighbors, and that in¬
demnities should be paid by way of compensation for the
goods of those who decide not to return to their homes and
for all goods lost or damaged, when by principles of inter¬
national law or in equity such loss or damage ought to be
made good by the governments concerned to the proper author¬
ities . (Quoted in Gerard CJhaliand, The Palestinian Resis¬
tance (Middlesex; Penguin Books, Inc., 1972), p. 35.)
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as a means to liberate Palestine. Meanwhile, some Palestin¬
ian and other Arab students of the American University in
Beirut formed, under the leadership of a Palestinian physi¬
cian, George Habash, the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM),
which also advocated Arab unity as a means for the libera¬
tion of Palestine.
In the 1950's a new generation of Palestinian activists,
those who had been too young to participate as leader in
the struggle of the 30's, came of age. These intellec¬
tuals, many of whom were Christians, were susceptible to
the position that Arab unity was the road to the liber¬
ation of Palestine.^
During and after the tripartite aggression of the
1956 Suez war, however, when Israel joined the British and
the French imperial powers in a pre-emptive war aimed at
destroying the new progressive Arab regime in Egypt, some
Palestinian students and intellectuals formed a clandestine
group (The Palestine National Liberation Movement), and
called upon the Palestinian people to depend on themselves
to liberate their land. They believed in the need for the
Palestinization of the Palestine problem as a result of the
inability of the Arab states to liberate Palestine.
Furthermore, after the failure of unity between Syria and
Egypt in 1961 and the success of the Algerian revolution in
1Quandt, et al., The Politics of Palestine, p. 49.
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1962 more Palestinians became convinced "that they could
not afford to wait until all of the Arab world was united.
They started to talk of an independent Palestinian entity
action."^ Later on, it became known that this clandestine
Palestinian organization was Fateh. Among its co-founders
and well-known leaders was Yassir Arafat, who has led the
organization since 1968. He was involved in the Arab-
Israeli conflict of 1947-1948 and became a refugee in Gaza
Strip. While studying engineering at Cairo University, he
became chairman of the local Palestine Students Federation
(1952-56) and served as a guerrilla fighter in the Egyptian
army during the British occupation in 1952-1953 and the 1956
Suez War. Later he went to Kuwait, where he worked in the
ministry of Public Works and operated a successful contract¬
ing company. In 1964 he left Kuwait to devote his full-time
to work with Fateh—The Palestine National Liberation Move¬
ment .
The Fateh group took the initiative to start an
armed struggle to liberate Palestine but it was prevented
^Leila S. Kadi, Basic Political Documents of the
Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (Beirut: Palestine
Research Center, 1969), p. 18.
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from doing so by Arab states, though Palestinian organiza¬
tions continued their secret publications and preparations
for protracted people's war. To curb the influence of the
newly developed secret Palestinian organization, Nasser
called for an Arab Suitimit meeting to discuss the Israeli
Diversion of the Jordan River, which was held in Alexandria
in 1964. As a result of that summit, the Arab states came
out with the foundation of a Palestinian organization, the
old Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and appointed
a Palestinian diplomat Ahmed El-Shukairy as its leader. It
stationed some of its troops in Gaza Strip, Iraq and Syria.
It was financed by the Arab League.^ Consequently, it was
structured along the same lines as conventional Arab armies
and followed the same orders as the armies of the host
countries.
In spite of the participation of Fateh in the First
National congress of the PLO (which was held in Jerusalem on
28 May 1964, under the supervision of the Arab League),
Fateh kept advocating a people's war rather than continued
^Arab League: Established in 1945 for the purpose of
coordinating action among Arab states for Arab unity and
harmony, with its headquarters in Cairo. Despite its failure
as an effective political organization in the Arab politics,
Arab states are still using it for policy coordination in
the Arab world.
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dependence on conventional warfare tactics which the Arab
states were planning to use in their war with Israel. Other
Palestinian organizations were calling for coordination with
progressive Arab regimes.
Up to this time Fateh was the sole organization which
called for the adoption of the principle of armed
struggle as the only means for the liberation of Pales¬
tine. Furthermore, Fateh believed that the Palestinians
should start an armed struggle irrespective of the re¬
action or plans of the Arab regimes. The Palestinian
branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement called for co¬
operation between the Palestinian armed struggle and the
plans of the progressive regimes, mainly the UAR.^
It may be safe here to say that Fateh started the
contemporary PLM on January 1965 and defined a new concept
of Palestinian nationalism. At that time Algeria and the
left wing of the Ba'ath party in Syria (which came to power
in the mid 60's)called for a people's war for the liberation
of Palestine. Thus, they cooperated with Fateh plans. The
rest of Arab states were against an independent Palestinian
military action, however.
The sudden defeat of the June 1967 war affirmed
Fateh's theory that regular Arab armies alone could not
defeat Israel. It also brought tremendous support for the
PLM political and military activities from Palestinian
people as well as from other Arab people.
1
Kadi, Basic Political Documents, p. 21.
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The victor of the war of June 67 were the Israeli and
the Palestinians... The Palestinian resistance, which
has developed as a result of the Arab countries'
military collapse, is the most fundamental political
fact to emerge in the aftermath of the war.^
The other major Palestinian organization is the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which
is the most militant of the PLM. The PFLP was formed out of
a merger between the Palestinian branch of the ANM (which
was formed in 1953 and collapsed after the June 67 war), and
a group of Palestinians known as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Because of the
strong Marxist-Leninist program of the PFLP and of an old
controversy between ANM and Ba'ath party, in 1968, the Ba'ath
party in Syria arrested Dr. George Habash, a leader of the
PFLP and three other members. During and after the PFLP
leaders' imprisonment in Syria, the PFLP went through two
major splits: The first, the Popular Front for the Libera¬
tion of Palestine-General Command announced its withdrawal
from the PFLP and complied with the Ba'ath party in Syria.
The second more important split came from the left wing of
the PFLP and formed the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) on February 10, 1969. The
PDFLP composed mostly of young Palestinians, elected Nayef
^Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance, p. 7.
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Hawamih leader. Mr. Hawamih is a Christian of working class
origin from the East Bank of Jordan and one of the co¬
founders of the ANM. He became associated with the ANM
while studying at the American University in Beirut. PDFLP
views itself as part of the world socialist revolutionary
movement.
The UAR and Jordan accepted the PLM plan to pressure
Israel to withdraw from Arab territories occupied during the
June 1967 war in case diplomatic maneuvers failed. Arab
regimes were still attempting to keep the PLM under their
control and influence. However, the Pedayeen began to
recruit and organize themselves for a revolutionary war
against Israel.
The contemporary PLM started from the bottom up.
The various PLM elements developed a degree of leadership,
organization and mass support quite different from the pre¬
vious PLM of the 30's and 40's and free from the control of
Arab regimes. The debate was on whether to start armed
struggle against Israel immediately or to build a party for
an effective political orientation and mobilization of the
Palestinian people. The Fateh group felt that armed
struggle was the best alternative for the following reasons:
First, Arab states are underdeveloped and they
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depend on outside modern armaments. It follows that pro¬
tracted people's war to match the military strength of
Israel is the most feasible. In their publication. Polit¬
ical and Armed Struggle pamphlet Fateh stated:
The Arab nation, and the Palestinian people included,
cannot wage a successful regular battle against Israel
and her allies because this nation comprises a great
number of underdeveloped countries which requires a
long time before they could industrialize themselves
and unite their forces in such a way to confront the
enemy in a regular battle.^
Second, the armed struggle will help unite all
Palestinian classes in a national popular liberation move¬
ment against Zionist institutions. "In the present phase,
the struggle should be a national one. This means that all
the classes which are against Zionism and imperialism should
form an alliance to destroy the Zionist imperialist occupa-
2
tion of Palestxne."
Third, the armed struggle will help obtain aid and
support from Arab states and people as long as it does not
interfere in the internal affairs of Arab regimes.
Unlike Fateh, both PFLP and PDFLP placed great
importance on political orientation. They stressed the
Political and Armed Struggle, Fateh-The Palestine
National Liberation Movement, p. 4.
2
Kadi, Basic Political Documents, pp. 103-104.
81
necessity of building a party capable of educating its mem¬
bers as well as the Arab people to the need for armed strug¬
gle and its purpose against Zionism, world imperialism and
Arab reactionary regimes. Both are Marxist-Leninist guer¬
rilla organizations and see the necessity of studying the
Palestinian question in terms of scientific socialist thought,
independent from the traditional Arab communist parties.
Scientific revolutionary thought can lead the masses to
understand their enemy, its point of weakness and
strength, and the forces which support it and are in
alliance with it. Moreover, scientific revolutionary
thought leads the masses to understand their own
strength, how to mobilize the forces of the revolution,
how to overcome the enemy and take advantage of its
weak points, and the organizational-military-political
programs which should be adopted to defeat the enemy
and ensure victory.^
They also believed that organization and mobiliza¬
tion of the refugees, peasantry and working class should be
based on the ideology of scientific socialism. Through this
ideology the masses will have a better classification and
understanding of their exploited conditions under imperi¬
alism and capitalism. It also will classify the importance
of their role and their need for a better future. Thus, the
PFLP and PDFLP attributed the failure of the Arab nationalist
movements in their liberation battles against Zionism,
^Ibid., p. 182.
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imperialism and Arab reactionary regimes to their failure in
mobilizing their people through scientific socialist ideol¬
ogy.
Meanwhile, the PFLP and PDFLP realized that the
Palestinian forces alone were not capable of defeating Israel
and her allies. They see the Palestine national liberation
struggle as part of the complete liberation of the Arab
world. Thus, they see the need of social and political
changes in the Arab world as prerequisite for a popular war
to liberate Palestine. They believe that political orienta¬
tion and armed struggle (mainly the PDFLP) will help to
bring the Arab world into a revolutionary level able to wage
a protracted people's war of liberation. Because of this
view they reject the "non-interference" line of Fateh. This
rejection on the part of PFLP and PDFLP, however, does not
mean that the Palestinian revolution will take the place of
the Arab liberation movements, but they feel that interfer¬
ence with Arab regimes is inevitable when it affects the
Palestinian national liberation struggle.
Notwithstanding, ever since the 1967 war, that the
old PLO had been discredited for being dependent on Arab
states, the different commando groups had been taking seats
on its executive committee. In 1969 the commando groups
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obtained the majority of seats in the National Congress.
Fateh gained the most seats and its official spokesman,
Yassir Arafat, was elected chairman of the executive com¬
mittee of the PLO. Through this national unity within the
framework of the PLO, the PLO became the representative of
the Palestinian people in demanding their goal of self-
determination and independence, as well as becoming the
revolutionary leader of all the Arab world.
Needless to say, all PLM factions continued in
guerrilla activities after the June 1967 war and had a
political and military effect on Israel, the Arab countries
and world imperialism. Their aim is the complete liberation
of Palestine through a combination of political and military
activities with the participation and support of the people
on a large scale, and the establishment of a democratic non¬
sectarian state in Palestine for all without any distinctions
on the basis of race, color or religion.
The PLM developed the capacity to carry out serious
protracted warfare mainly between the Karamah Battle of
March 1968^ and September 1970. The PLM became more
^A town of 50,000 uprooted Palestinians which was
gradually building itself as an agricultural and trade
center. It is on the East Bank of the Jordan River. It be¬
came a guerrilla base after the June 1967 war to launch
commando activities against Israel. On march 21, 1968
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elaborate structurally and began to develop important polit¬
ical functions of a nation-building character in Jordan with
Fateh being the largest and strongest in men and material
resources. “...It soon had its own well trained, well
equipped army, its own hospitals, schools, social security,
and tax collectors—not only by virtue of the Arab people's
generous financial support, but also thanks to the careful
planning and practical approach of its leadership."^ It
also became radical ideologically. This development in¬
creased the influence of the movement among Palestinian and
other Arab people and gained popular support.
The growth and independence of the PLM concerned the
ruling classes of the U.S., U.S.S.R., Israel and Arab states.
Equilibrium was maintained by the modus vivendi between
Israel attacked the town with heavy artillery with the in¬
tention of destroying the morale of the Palestinian and Arab
people and their support for the PLM. The results were im¬
portant turning points in the history of the PLM. The
Palestine guerrilla men were fully prepared for the Israeli
attack. Within ten hours of close range combat, the Israeli
troops who had undergone a traumatic experience at the hands
of the Fedayeen, started rolling back vdiile being harassed
by fierce Palestinian and Jordanian shelling and counter at¬
tacks. The outcome of the battle was exactly opposite to
what Israel planned and predicted. It raised Palestinian
and Arab morale and thousands of young Palestinian men joined
the PLM.
Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrilla—Their Credi¬
bility and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Uni¬
versity, 1970), p. 28.
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Israel and the Arab states: Israel, supported by Western
imperialism, was to refrain from aggression, but in ex¬
change the Arab states had to prevent the Palestinian
people from challenging the Zionist colonization of their
country. If either Israel or the Palestinians were to
violate this modus vivendi, everything would inevitably
be put in question again.
Consequently, when the PLM injected an element of instability
in the local political-military situation and a potential
additional risk of great power conflict in the area, the re¬
sult was the attempt to liquidate the PLM in Jordan (where
its military strength and popular support lay) with Ameri¬
can aid and Israeli readiness to intervene in case the move¬
ment got the upper hand over King Hussein.
In July 1970, Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan
2
declared their acceptance of the Rogers Peace Plan. The
PLM rejected any peace settlement with Israel. In order to
3
achieve the UN resolution of November 22, 1967, however, the
^Kodsy and Lobel, The Arab World and Israel, p. 49.
2
Rogers Peace Plan: The U.S. proposed a peaceful
solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1970. It was
accepted by both Egypt and Jordan and posed a direct chal¬
lenge to the PLM which eventually led to the September 1970
civil war in Jordan. Free Palestine, vol. 2, no. 9
(January, 1971).
3
The UN resolution of November 22, 1967 stated: (1)
The Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in
June '67 war; (2) The end of belligerency and recognition of
sovereignty; territorial integrity and political indepen¬
dence of all states in the area; (3) To guarantee the free¬
dom of navigation through international waterways in the
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curbing of the PLM became imminent. Egypt closed the voice
of Palestine radio in Cairo, and in September 1970 the
ruling class of Jordan carried out a war of liquidation of
the resistance forces in Jordan. Fedayeen and the Palestin¬
ian population mainly in refugee camps were under heavy
artillery shelling for nine days. The USSR discouraged the
Arab states from supporting the resistance, and pressured
Syria to stop her help to the resistance during the Septem¬
ber 1970 civil war. The 12,000 man Iraqi force stationed in
Jordan stood idly by through the liquidation.
Eventually, the resistance lost its military bases
in Jordan by July 1971 and failed to protect its indepen¬
dence and integrity from Arab states. After the expulsion
of the Palestinian military bases from Jordan, a debate
within the resistance developed over future direction. This
debate resulted in the adoption of the following; (1) The
formation of a united Palestinian-Jordanian front to over¬
throw Hussein; (2) acceptance of the PLO as the umbrella
organization for all Palestinian guerrilla groups, although
complete unity within the PLO was not achieved;
area; (4) A just solution of the refugee problem; and (5) To
guarantee the territorial inviolability and political inde¬
pendence of all states in the area through measures includ¬
ing the establishment of demilitarized zones. (Quoted in
Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, p. 203.)
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(3) cooperation among Palestinian organizations in local
activities including coordination of militia units in
Lebanon; (4) the rejection of external activities (overseas
commando operations) on the grounds that it diverted atten¬
tion from the main tasks of mobilizing and organizing the
Palestinian people.^
On the other hand, the October 1973 war caused a
division among the resistance and particularly its position
toward the Geneva Convention (see Chapter IV). Another
crucial consequence of the October war is that the leadership
on the Palestinian question that the Palestinian resistance
gained after the June 1967 war passed once again into the
hands of the Arab states. The 1973 October war convinced
all governments involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict that
without a settlement stability in the area could not be main¬
tained. The success of Arab military forces in shaking
Israeli military strategy particularly during the first week
of the war dispelled the myth of Israeli "invincibility."
It also revealed the great revolutionary potential of the
Arab people and their determination and readiness to fight
for the return of Israeli occupied territory and self-
determination. It showed that Arab people can be united and
1
•^Merip Reports, no. 28, p. 6.
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have the power to carry out the fight against imperialism
and Zionism. It proved that support from the United States
for Israeli military superiority and expansionist policy can
no longer continue and is perhaps detrimental to interest of
the United States in the area unless the Arab people and
particularly the Palestinians will be satisfied. The war
had been very costly to Israel economically, politically and
in terms of human life. "Economic losses from the war cost
Israel an amount double the annual budget and helped lead to
the fall of the Meir government, dictating a search for a new
policy at the expense of some sort of settlement."^
Besides, ever since 1970 Egypt has been working
toward a settlement mainly through United States initiative
to pressure Israel for territorial concessions. The accep¬
tance of "Rogers peace plan" of 1970, the expulsion of
Soviet advisors in 1972, the acceptance of United States
capital in Egypt, the restoration of diplomatic relations
with the United States in 1974, and Sadat's attitude towards
Kissinger's step-by-step efforts, all point in this direc¬
tion .
Syria also has been working toward a negotiated
settlement with Israel. The Syrian attitude toward United
^Ibid., p. 7.
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States policy in the area and its acceptance of Kissinger's
"peace" efforts did not contradict its policy before the
October war. Syria is still against any agreement that
omits an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and it is
in complete support of the PLO.
The Jordanian regime has been working towards a
negotiated settlement with Israel for a long time. It was
the Israeli leaders who refused cooperation with King
Hussein on the question of the West Bank. However, as a
result of Jordan's nonparticipation directly in the October
war and its ruler's previous suppression of the Palestinian
people and especially during the September 1970 civil war,
its political authority over the Palestinian population in
the West Bank has been weakened and gradually shifted in
favor of the PLO.
Given these historical developments and the possi¬
bility of a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli con¬
flict and the initial Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab
territories, the PLO began to seek recognition from the Arab
states and the international community as the sole leader of
the Palestinian people. The PLO's political and diplomatic
efforts to lead the Palestinian people have been successful.
"After the war it did in fact move to consolidate this
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position, dispatching delegations to Moscow, to the Algiers
Arab Summit Conference and the Labour Islamic Conference to
receive recognition as the sole representative of the
Palestinian people."^ It was in the Rabat Arab Summit Con¬
ference, which was held in the Morrocan Capital on October
8, 1974 that all Arab leaders finally voted for the PLO to
be the sole representative and spokesman of all Palestinians
and supporting the establishment of an independent Palestin¬
ian national state on any liberated territory. Unanimous
Arab endorsement of the PLO as the "sole representative of
the Palestinian people" clarified the impasse between the
Palestinian right for self-determination in their own home¬
land and the claims of the Israeli leaders who described the
PLO as "terrorist organizations" and ruled out any conces¬
sions to the PLO. The Arab leaders unanimous vote gave the
PLO the unchallengeable position of being the central voice
for all Palestinians and gained the attention of the UN
which invited the PLO by a vote of 105 to 4 to address the
General Assembly in November 1974.
As to their achievements, the PLM has been success¬
ful in their call for armed struggle by gaining a real mass
movement that creates the necessary potential power for the
^Ibid., p. 8.
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defeat of imperialism and Zionism. It was able to develop
the Palestinian armed struggle from clandestine guerrilla
groups to that of a popular liberation movement. It
improved its military training and equipment and brought
social changes within the Palestinian community. It opened
schools for the children of the martyrs, clinics to meet
the need of the Fedayeen and Palestinian people and social
institutions to strengthen the bonds between the movement
and the people. "The content of the education has generally
been progressive, stressing such simple ideas as secularism,
equality between men and women,freedom and social justice
for all regardless of color, religion or origin and commit¬
ment to the ultimate goal of the liberation of Palestine.
Intensified efforts from various Palestinian organizations
have been made to instill confidence among the Palestinian
people in their ability to strive for the liberation of
their land.
It has been successful in creating an independent
Palestinian political entity locally and internationally as
a result of its achievement of national unity within the
framework of the PLO where all active commando organizations
could meet. The PLO gained a world-wide recognition as the
^Quandt, The Politics of Palestine, p. 151.
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central factor in the conflict with Israel and must be con¬
sidered in discussing the future of the area and particularly
to the demand of the Palestinian people for self-determina¬
tion, for a return of the Palestinian people to their home¬
land, and for the privileges of nationhood. The PLO has
participated in numerous international conferences of various
types and has utilized those forums to assert its presence
in Algeria, Morroco, Italy, Germany, France, China, Cuba,
Russia, and the UN.
As a result of these effective local and interna¬
tional political activities, the PLO has been successful in
isolating Zionist diplomacy and its propaganda on the inter¬
national scene such as the breaking of diplomatic relations
between Israel and many African countries during and after
the 1973 war, the expulsion of Israel from UNESCO in November
1974 and the historical appearance of the PLO in the UN in
November 1974. It also helped in creating a revolutionary
atmosphere among the Palestinian community in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip including the Palestinian community under
occupation since 1948, and in counter-acting the Zionist
effort among some Palestinian notables to set up a puppet
Palestinian entity.
Perhaps the most important achievement of the PLM is
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its trend toward a democratic solution of the problem in
which both Jews and Arab Palestinians will enjoy equal rights
and responsibilities within the area of Palestine. Though
the range of possible political solutions to reach a demo¬
cratic solution has hardly been explored, at least one can
find some Palestinians and some Jews advocating national
rights for Jews as well as Arabs in Palestine.
CHAPTER IV
A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO THE
PALESTINIAN QUESTION
Theoretically speaking, one of the most important
concepts developed within the Palestinian Liberation Move¬
ment (PLM) is its requirement of a democratic solution to
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the goal being a unitary,
nonsectarian, democratic Palestine for both Palestinians and
Jews. This unitary democratic Palestine defines the pos¬
sible relations between the Jewish people exploited under
the Zionist regime and exiled oppressed Arab Palestinians in
a common struggle to overthrow the Zionist military and
socio-economic institutions with the goal of a democratic
state in Palestine.
After an extensive search in the original documents
of the PLM, the writer found a commitment to a democratic
state in Palestine in all three major PLM groups. They have
continuously declared that they are not against Jews as a
people, but they are against Zionist ideologies.
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Consequently, the PLM began to demand more clearly than ever
the Palestinian people's right for self-determination in
their homeland. They began to gain a hearing and popular
support locally and internationally for their legitimate
rights in fighting against the colonialist Zionist occupa¬
tion and in representing a just solution to the problem.
It is clear in the minds of many Palestinian leaders
and cadres that the achievement of the ultimate goal of a
democratic state in Palestine requires a long struggle and
will encounter many local and international problems. In
order to overcome these problems, the PLM has developed
political and economic programs which are sensitive to class
and ethnic contradiction in the area. For instance, Fateh,
the largest Palestinian resistance movement declared in her
yearbook of 1968:
Our revolution has been and will remain a humanitarian
revolution that presents to the world the open Palestin¬
ian society as a substitute to the closed Zionist
society. We call for an Arab Palestinian state with no
traces of Zionist racism, with all its military, polit¬
ical and economic institutions. Then, the Jew will find
his place within this progressive democratic state
irrespective of religion, color or nationality.^
In short, a new Palestine will have "a new politics
^Fateh Yearbook (Arabic) (Beirut: Bar al-Tali'ah,
1968), p. 55.
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and a new economy."^ On the political level, it is the
democracy of workers, students, peasants, refugees and the
patriotic revolutionary forces versus Zionism, Imperialism
and Capitalism. It is for the return and the freedom of the
Palestinian people to determine their destiny in their home¬
land and the freedom of exploited and misled Jews under
Zionist regime. Abu Eyad, a member of Fateh Central Com¬
mittee, explains Fateh's position concerning the "Palestine
democratic state" in a dialogue with Lutfi al Khouli, editor
of the Egyptian monthly magazine ad Tali'ah;
Khouli: What does Al-Fateh exactly understand by
'Palestine democratic state?' Abu Eyad: We have always
believed and declared, and will continue to declare,
that armed struggle is not an end in itself. It is a
means for a great humanitarian aim...We carry arms in
order to achieve a truly peaceful settlement of the
problem, and not a false settlement based on the imposi¬
tion of aggression and racism. Such peace cannot be
achieved except within the framework of a democratic
state in Palestine.^
On the economic level, it is for the replacement of the
means of production and distribution under new Palestine
state control.
A democratic and progressive Palestine, however, rejects
by elimination a theocratic, a feudalist, an aristocratic.
This is similar to Mao's description of the two
stages of revolutions in his book On New Democracy (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 1967).
2
Kadi, Basic Political Documents, p. 75.
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an authoritarian or a racist-chauvinistic form of govern¬
ment . It will be a country that does not allow oppres¬
sion or exploitation of any group of people by any other
group or individuals, a state that provides equal
opportunities for its people in work, education, polit¬
ical decision-making, cultural and artistic expression.^
This is Fateh's fundamental view of the relation
between the Palestinian revolution and the Zionist movement
and the relation of Palestinians to Jews in new Palestine.
Clearly, it follows that the elimination of Zionist ideology
and influence is the first objective of liberation, since
only then can a nationalist democratic Palestine be created.
The truth is that the concept of a democratic state
represents a militant standpoint for the Palestinian
problem and not an emblem of political surrender. It
can take root only out of liberation and as a conse¬
quence of liberation; hence, it is not a substitute for
liberation. It cannot take place on a part of Palestine
alone, but on the purlieu of the entire Palestinian
soil. Should a tiny Arab village remain with Zionist
tutelage it would be in direct contradiction with the
concept from its inception. Thus, this democratic state
cannot be an offshoot of negotiation with the colonial¬
ist Zionist de facto which it purports to destroy and
uproot.^
Next to Fateh, the second major Palestinian resis¬
tance movement is the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). It is a Marxist-Leninist organization
Mohammad Rasheed, Towards A Democratic State In
Palestine (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research




which analyzes the Palestine question from a socialist per¬
spective. In an interview with its leader George Habash, it
is explained that the PFLP stands for a "Palestine demo¬
cratic state":
We are waging a democratic national liberation struggle
which has a socialist orientation, aiming at putting an
end to Israel's entity as a racist, aggressive and
usurper state linked with imperialism...When the demo¬
cratic liberation struggle achieves its objectives,
every Jew living in Palestine will enjoy equal and full
rights with other citizens...The numerical, religious,
or cultural presence of this group or that group is a
question which can be faced democratically and settled
on the basis of scientific socialism and its principles.^
The third major Palestinian resistance movement, the
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PDFLP), recognizes the national rights of both Arabs and
Jews. Its position for a democratic state appears in a
memo submitted to the Palestine National Assembly (6th
Session, September, 1969) under the title "Toward A Demo¬
cratic Solution to the Palestinian Question":
The struggle for a popular democratic solution for the
Palestinian and Israeli question is to be based on the
liquidation of the Zionist entity exemplified in all the
government establishments (army, administration, police)
and all the chauvinistic Zionist political and labor
organizations. The aim is the establishment of a
people's democratic Palestinian state in which the
Arabs and (Israeli) Jews will live without any discrimi¬
nation whatsoever. A state which is against all forms
^Al-Hadaf (Arabic) , (Beirut) December 20, 1969.
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of class and national subjugation, and which gives both
Arabs and (Israeli) Jews the right to develop their
national culture.^
Thus, in short, the PLM, conceived as a revolutionary
movement, committed itself to the following essential prin¬
ciples: (1) a continuous revolutionary movement struggling
against the illegitimate presence of an aggressive Zionist
state on the Palestinian land; (2) the creation of a social
and economic revolution ending all Zionist, racist and
chauvinist government establishments which will be converted
into parts of a progressive democratic society wherein each
person is treated equally regardless of origin, a society
not closed upon itself, but rather open to all citizens in
the area; and (3) elimination of all forms of class discrim¬
ination, exploitation and national oppression. They are
committed to equality and to social justice for all.
As time went on, however, the development of the
situation (mainly as a consequence of the October 1973 war)
led the PLM to a critical juncture which threw in doubt the
future political directions of the Palestinian resistance
movonent. Post-October war events provoked an on-going de¬
bate among all factions of the PLM on the expected role of
^The PDFLP, The Palestine Resistance Movement in its
Present Situation (Beirut, Bar al Tali'ah, 1969), p. 166.
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the Geneva Convention. The question arose: how can the PLO
at the Geneva Convention secure an independent national
Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with¬
out recognizing the Zionist entity with secure borders,
thereby causing a major setback to the Palestinian National
struggle? PFLP specifically does not expect or desire a
Palestinian state to come out of a Geneva Convention whose
framework is based on the UN Resolution 242 for 1967.
Consequently, this on-going debate has been revolving
around three central groups:
1. Those vdio will accept an "independent" Palestin¬
ian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
according to the limitations and restrictions the
Zionist state requires which is mainly a recogni¬
tion of Israel with its expansionist views.
2. Those who reject the Geneva Convention as a
resolution to the problem on the ground that it
is based on the UN Resolution 242, i.e., in favor
of United States-Israeli-Arab reactionary
proposals, and that it would compromise the
ultimate goal of complete liberation.
3. Those who see the validity of the PLO's presence
at the Geneva Convention as the sole representative
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of the Palestinian people with a clear, concrete
program that guarantees acceptance by, and the
support of, the Palestinian people for the reso¬
lution, in order to maintain the essential
objectives of the resistance. This program,
presented by the leader of the Palestinian people
Arafat, will prevent any Arab state or states
from speaking on behalf of the Palestinian people
It will also preserve the continued non¬
recognition of Israel by Palestinians or Arab
states and assert the right of nationhood in any
liberated Palestinian territory.
As to the first position, its supporters argue that
it is to the advantage of the Palestinian people to accept
an "independent" Palestinian state on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. They are for PLO participation as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people at the Geneva Con¬
vention within the limitations imposed by UN Resolution 242
which compromises the historical rights of the Palestinian
people. They would cease trying to defeat Zionism, imperi¬
alism and capitalism in Palestine.
In many ways, then, this group represents the view
and the interest of the comprador section of the Palestinian
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bourgeois. It fails to present a clear definition of the
type of state it would accept. As a result, it lacks the
support of the majority of the Palestinian people who are
for a complete liberation of Palestine.
These bourgeois claim that a mini-Palestinian state
will be a step towards the long march of liberation. They
deny the fact that this state will be forbidden all commando
activities and the use of hostilities against Israel accord¬
ing to the UN Resolution 242, and that the UN with the
support of the big powers will take all necessary steps to
prevent the violation of such an agreement. How then could
it, in fact, be a step towards the ultimate liberation after
it has been restricted and prevented from implementing such
revolutionary actions? It is conceivable that a state like
this will be under the mercy of Jordan on one side and
Israel on the other. Israel will demand a high price for
that state; namely, the domination of that state. In that
case, the future Palestinian state will become an outpost of
repressive Israeli industrial society which will use it as a
bridge to infiltrate the Arab market. Besides, the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip are not sufficient in size or eco¬
nomic strength to absorb all the exiled Palestinian refugees.
That is to say, the problem of the two million Palestinian
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refugees will remain without solution. In addition, the
population of the Gaza Strip is currently undergoing a
tremendous increase, to the point that it will require a
drastic solution to alleviate its present social difficul¬
ties .
This group also hopes that acceptance of a mini-
Palestinian state will facilitate integration between Arab
Palestinians and Jews \(diich eventually will lead to the
creation of democratic state in all Palestine. This is not
a feasible plan because Israel will always try to control
the new changes in the area to suit its advantage at the
expense of the Arab masses. Though Israel's internal social
problems might develop as a result of a peaceful settlement
between her and the Arab states, at present no such
challenges appear to be very effective.
Thus, given the present state of development of
national aspirations and the need to resist colonialism in
all its forms, such a state does not resolve the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. It will not bring a permanent peace to
the area because it deals only with the manifestation of the
problem, with the side issues and not the heart of the
matter. The heart of the issue is the confrontation between
an alienating Zionist movement that has expelled the
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Palestinian people, occupied their land and created an ex-
clusivist, racist society against the Palestinian people who
are trying to attain self-determination in their own home¬
land and want to build a democratic society without any form
of exploitation or discrimination. Consequently, if one
does not pursue a radical solution of the problem, all these
talks of peaceful settlement will not get anywhere, just as
they have failed to do so in the past fifty years.
As to the second argument, its proponents are
against the participation of the PLO at the Geneva Conven¬
tion and call for a continuous armed struggle. They base
their judgment on the balance of power in the area in terms
of their evaluation of the situation. They do not expect
that the Geneva Convention will bring any radical solutions.
They question a political solution of the problem from what
they have experienced with the Zionist establishment and its
aggressive and expansionist objectives particularly in the
last twenty-seven years. Though they recognize all the
positive consequences of the October war locally and inter¬
nationally, yet they question whether these developments
will have any major impact on Zionist aims. They strongly
believe that the maximum that ruling groups in Israel will
agree on will not be acceptable to the Palestinian people
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and its national aspirations.
They say that Israel has rebuilt its military power
after the October war and that it is still demanding more
arms and support from the United States as well as the world
Zionist movement. Israel tries to maintain its military
superiority in order to achieve political and economic gains
in the area. It is the Israeli policy to maintain military
superiority over all the Arab states combined regardless of
the promises and security guaranteed to her by the super¬
powers . Consequently, it is to the advantage of Israel to
keep the area in tension till it gets what it needs from the
outside imperialist camp. A balance of power in the area
for Israel and its imperialist allies means the return of
the conditions before the October 1973 war. This is mani¬
fested in Israel's continuous encouragement for more Jewish
immigration to Israel, the spreading of Israeli settlement
in the Arab occupied lands, and Israel's stand towards
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
American involvement in the area has always been in
favor of Israel. Under every President of the United States,
from Harry Truman to Gerald Ford, the safety of Israel has
continuously been guaranteed. Today there are no signs that
the United States will change its attitude towards Israel
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and put pressure on it for territorial concessions satisfac¬
tory to the Arab people. Thus, the gain of the October war
will be limited to improve the political situation following
the 1967 war.
The other more pronounced evaluation of these
"rejection groups" is that Arab acceptance of the Geneva
Convention reflects a loss of hope in the great potential
and determination of the Arab people to carry on a libera¬
tion struggle. This lack of confidence is misleading be¬
cause the war of October 1973 proved that the Arab people
can be united and have the material and moral resources to
carry out the fight against Zionism and imperialism. That
war showed that the Arab people have everything they need—
except correct leadership—to solve their dilemmas of
national liberation.
Besides, they add, not all Arab states are for
participation at the Geneva Convention. There are some
Arab states which will cooperate with the resistance and
wait till the national liberation struggle among the Arab
masses reaches its full mobilization and organization to
fight against Zionism and imperialism. Thus, they warn the
Arab people of the danger of acceptance of the Geneva Con¬
vention and particularly of a mini-Palestinian state. This
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is because acceptance of a mini-Palestinian state within the
framework of UN Resolution 242 will not only endanger the
PLM activities in the host Arab countries, but it will also
demonstrate the Arab states' inability to face the greater
challenge of solving the basic issues of Arab national
liberation and the achievement of a permanent peace.
It follows that a sustained mass movement that
creates the necessary power to defeat imperialism and
Zionism is the most feasible answer to these issues. But a
rejection of the Geneva Convention is not to the advantage
of the Palestinian national struggle because it will open
the doors to the Hashemite Kingdom or other Arab states to
speak on behalf of the Palestinian people, just as they have
done in the past, mainly during and after the 1948 defeat.
As to the third argument, it's proponents believe
that the PLM is like any other movoment which develops
through stages, and each stage of the struggle is related
and connected with the next stage. Emphasis is put on what¬
ever decision or move the PLM decides will not be separated
from protecting its main objective—the ultimate liberation
of Palestine. The process of liberation according to this
view could be achieved only by following the necessary pro¬
gram for each stage that will enable the resistance gradually
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to hold better and stronger positions. This program is
linked with the Palestinian national struggle "that expresses
the direct interests of the patriotic classes in this strug¬
gle against the enemy, for only such slogans are capable of
mobilizing the widest sectors of these classes and organiz¬
ing them by clarifying their immediate tasks in a given
period."^ It is the responsibility of the PLO to choose a
realistic program suiting the present period without com¬
promising on its essential principles. Thereafter, the PLO
leaders and cadres will decide on the means and strategy
which should be adopted to achieve these objectives.
Since the support of the Arab states is needed, it
is necessary for the PLO to start its communication with the
progressive Arab regimes and friendly nations in order to
gain their adherence and support for the success of this
concrete program.
The formation of a concrete program of the basic
demands should spell out the limits of compromise acceptable
to the Palestinians, should be effective enough to rally
Arab world and other friendly nations for the Palestinians'
cause, and should be strong enough to challenge the United
States-Israeli-Arab reactionary proposals.
^Quoted in Merip Reports, no. 28, p. 8.
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In that case, Israel and its imperialist allies will
be faced with two alternatives: (1) either Israel will be
forced to recognize the PLO and give some concessions to the
Palestinian people; or (2) its refusal to deal with the PLO
as the leader of the Palestinian people will stimulate the
armed struggle as the only means left to regain Palestinian
rights.
Thus, it is the position of this group to go to the
Geneva Convention if the PLO received an invitation as the
sole representative of the Palestinian people, thereby gain¬
ing formal recognition from the United States and Israel and
preventing any Arab states from representing the Palestinian
people. They also believe that the presence of the PLO at
the Geneva Convention will give it the opportunity to declare
its objectives to the world.
It follows that the third group appears more effec¬
tive than the other two groups in achieving positive results
without compromise on the Palestinian revolution's essential
principles, mainly non-recognition of Israel. In addition,
it will establish its legitimate right to rule in any inde¬
pendent national authority created in territory liberated
from Israeli occupation.
Naturally, this third group has met with great
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difficulties in achieving its goal in dealing with Israel.
This goal is the return of the exiled Palestinian people to
their country of origin and the establishment of a democratic
national Palestine for both Arabs and Jews, which is to say,
the elimination of the Zionist establishments (military,
political and economic) from all Palestine. Potentially,
the Arab masses are far superior to Israel in terms of land
area, manpower and economic strength. Their need is to get
united to form a concrete common strategy for the complete
liberation of Palestine.
Despite Israel's success in capturing Arab terri¬
tories, expelling most of the indigenous Arab population,
the settlement of more Jewish immigrants and its success in
obtaining outside financial, military and political support,
Arab states are still determined to regain their historical
rights and object to any recognition of the state of Israel.
It is Israeli insistence in refusing to address
itself to the great injustice committed against the Palestin¬
ian and other Arab people, its refusal to denounce her
Zionist role, which is alien to the area, that make Israel’s
establishment incompatible with the Arab people. Hence,
when it comes to reaching a peaceful settlement between
Israel and the Arab states, Israel concessions are not in
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the interest of the Arab people. Israel's main objective is
to maintain its military superiority and expansionist policy
at the expense of the Arab people.
Israel by its own efforts cannot follow a policy
satisfactory to the Arab people so that the Jewish state
would be accepted as a sister state in the region. This is
because Israel is tied to imperialism and the world Zionist
movement, and Israeli interests are always in contradiction
to Arab aspirations. To survive, it has to depend heavily
on outside support and to resort to aggressive methods in
order to bring the Arab states into submission. But this
action has not brought peace. Arab states are still for
Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and a
recognition of the Palestinian national rights.
The radical solution is that Israel adopt a policy
of equality and the possibility of its implementation: that
the Palestinian people ought to have the right to determine
their destiny; they ought to have the right to return to
their homeland; they ought to have the right to establish
the state that would insure their interests and protect their
rights for the future. Meanwhile, they must offer the
(Israeli) Jews the right to stay and live in Palestine as
equals.
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Thus, to bring an aicceptable resolution to the Arab-
israeli conflict, Israel must become part of the region. In
that case, future Israel must be without the Zionist policy
which has provoked conflict between Zionism and Arab nation¬
alism ever since the Balfour Declaration of 1917. But
Israel is not able to do so, because her structure is still
largely controlled by Zionist leaders who plan to continue
this outlook and expansionist policy at the expense of the
Arab resources and people. Thus, in the prevailing circum¬
stances, a radical solution must be brought to Israeli
society from outside the occupied territories and particu¬
larly outside the territory occupied during the 1948-1949
war.
In short, the resistance is confronted with the need
to mobilize and organize the Arab masses to wage a revolu¬
tionary popular liberation struggle to end Israel's Zionist
establishment. By doing so, the resistance would be against
all forms of colonialism, Zionism and class discrimination.
It is for the freedom of Jews as well as the freedom of
Palestinians, contrary to the negative propaganda of the
Zionists and their Western allies about the Palestinian
cause. The Palestinian liberation is not anti-Jewish as the
Zionist and its Western allies claim, but anti-Zionist.
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Furthermore, the Palestinians would give the (Israeli) Jews
peace, something they would hardly achieve under the state
of Israel with its present outlook. It would be a peace
that is based on social justice and equality for all.
The fact of the matter is that the United States
support to Israel and its expansionist policy against the
Arabs, has not only delayed the achievement of peace, but
has also effected their interest in the area and their
initiative for the achievement of peace. The Geneva talks
are almost certain to fail, thus making resumption of
another war in the area inevitable. America's previous
step-by-step effort, the latest attempt by Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger to arrange a second stage withdrawal
by Israel almost failed when Israel demanded a formal pledge
of non-belligerency from Egypt in return for Israeli with¬
drawal from the Giddi and Mitla passes and the Abu Rudeis
oil fields in the Sinai desert.
The fact remains that United States policy in the
Arab-Israeli conflict is based on exploiting the Arab masses
The unity of world imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction
aims to control the Arab revolutionary potentials, disregard
ing the aspiration of Arab people. The United States pro¬
claims its intention of bringing a negotiated peaceful
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settlement which guarantees the independence and territorial
integrity of all nations in the region. But in fact, the
American commitment is to protect Israel's existence even
when the latter persists in refusing to withdraw from all
occupied Arab territories and in refusing its recognition of
the Palestinian historical rights. Thus, when the United
States, Israeli and Arab reactionaries talk of peaceful
settlement, they mean controlling the potentials of the Arab
masses and liquidating the Palestinian liberation struggle.
It follows that the Palestinian resistance will not
be able to defeat Israel and its allies unless it gains the
full support and participation of the Arab masses through a
clear understanding of the positions of various regimes,
parties, political leaderships and classes in the region.
This clarification is now badly needed at the present stage
of the movement, on the eve of the signing of the initial
accord between Israel and Egypt, a time when the Arab
national liberation struggle threatens the interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Moreover,
the Palestinian resistance has a major impact on the balance
of world power. It represents a fatal danger to the sur¬
vival of colonialism, imperialism and all forms of exploita¬
tion .
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This is why there is unity between the big powers to
fight against the Palestinian resistance, mainly by creating
a division in the Arab national struggle against colonialism
and Zionists. Thus, the big powers proffer proposals and
declarations which they hope would satisfy some local in¬
terests at the expense of the essential principles of the
Arab national liberation struggle. It is also their purpose
to create a division within the resistance.
The answer to all these conspiracies is within the
Palestinian resistance and that of the progressive Arab
states as well as world progressive forces. This is because
a strong, determined Palestinian armed struggle supported by
Arab progressive and world forces is the true vehicle for
the achievement of a democratic non-sectarian Palestine,
while the United States-Israeli-Arab reactionary "peace"
proposals is tantamount to weakness and capitulation.
In view of all that, the PLM becomes a reality and
poses a challenge to the false existence of the expansionist,
colonialist Zionist state in Palestine. That is to say,
there is a Palestinian national problem to reckon vis-a-vis
the aims of Zionism and imperialism in the Middle East. The
emergence and development of the PLM sharpens the contradic¬
tions between Arab revolutionary forces and the powers of
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domination and exploitation.
For instance, the American establishment fears its
power will slip from the Middle East if it allows the PLM
to develop a revolutionary movement. This fear plays a
primary role in US and USSR policy in the area. But it is
Israel that is considered the surest guarantee of USA's eco¬
nomic and power interest in the Middle East by the continu¬
ing success of Israeli goals which include; (1) dividing and
confusing the Arabs, (2) discrediting the PLO and its leader¬
ship of the Palestinian people to freedom and self-
determination, and (3) making Israel one of the best armed
of Mediterranean power.
Also the defeat of American imperialism in Indochina
made a significant shift in the extent and intensity of
US-Israel collaboration. This policy has resulted from
America's desire to maintain its heg^ony in the area at the
expense of Arab people and resources. A classical example
is the latest US "peace" initiatives by obtaining the recent
Egyptian-Israeli agreement in Sinai, favoring the colonialist
goals of Israel and ensuring US hegemony in the area.
Consequently, placing Arab national liberation within
a dialectic of struggle, and counting first and foremost on
the PLM and the dynamic of Arab masses. A united Arab
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nationalist front of all revolutionary forces is an impor¬
tant prerequisite for the liberation of Palestine. The
other more pronounced prerequisite of Arab national libera¬
tion is the building of a common strategy. That is to say,
any approach to a concrete, definitive solution to the Arab
national problem implies, as a prerequisite, that an appro¬
priate united stand be taken regarding the strategy of Arab
national liberation front. This unity of strategy and
liberation will lead to a profound recognition of the moral
and material Arab resources toward progressive objectives
and must be in accord with the needs, priorities and
legitimate interests of Arab masses.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANM: Arab Nationalist Movement
PDFLP: Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
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PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
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PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
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